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AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
EVALUATING THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF EDUCATORS

By Brett G. Scharffs *and fohn W. Welch**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The law, it seems, is of increasing concern to teachers and educators. 1
A generation ago, teachers, administrators, schools, school districts, and
universities seldom worried about being held legally liable for their
actions or failures to act. This is no longer the case. In recent years,
educators and educational institutions have been found legally liable for a
variety of types of misconduct, in a wide range of contexts, and under
several legal theories, including criminal law/ tort law,' sexual

· Profe."m of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. ll.S.B.A., M.A.
Gc·orgctown l;niversity; B. Phil Oxford University; j.D. Yale Law School. Copyright \<J Brett G.
Sch,~rlls 2004. A version of this paper was presented at the Second Virginia Fducation Law
Conference in Richmond Virginia in April 2004, and an abbreviated vcrs1on of this article was
published as Brett (;. Scharffs and john W. Welch, Rcconceptrwlizing the Fiduciary Duties of
Educators, Critical Issues in Education Law and Policy, Conference l'mceedings, Second Virginia
hluo.:ation Law Conference, 99-118, LexisNexis (2004). We thank Richard \'acca, Marti Collier, and
their colleagues at Virginia Commonwealth University li>r the oppo~tunity to present our research in
that forum, and gratefully acknowledge LexisNexis for copyright permission to include materials
from that article. We thank Betsy l'owlcr, Ryan Morris, Rebekah Clark, and Kelley ,\1arsden l·nr their
helpful research assistance.
•· Robert K. Thomas Professor of Law,). Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University B.A.,
M.A. Brigham Young University; Lit. Hum. Oxford University; j.D. Duke Law School. Copyright :u
john W. Welch 2004
I. Sec Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Wclwmc to Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. News & World Rpt. M,
june 16, 2003; Mark Carpenter, "Education Not Litigation: The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Liability
Protection Act of 200 I," http:/ /www.cse.org/in!(mned/pdf__filcs/ cc293 _·1 'eacher_Protection __ Act.pdf
(,\larch 21, 2001) ("[T]eachers are becoming more and more concerned each school year with the
threat of lawsuits. In tiKt, a survey by the American l'ederation of Teachers shows that liability
protection ranks ;.unong the top three concerns leachcrs want their unions to addrc.'.,...,."); Jes:-.ica
Portner, Fear/ill Teachers Huy Lia/Ji/ity Insurance, Education Week (March 29, 2000) (showing that
the number of teachers purchasing liability insurance increased twenty-five percent between 1995
and 2000).

2. Sec e.g Stale v. Clay, 2005 WL l?SI:\5 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. jan. 5, 2005) (upholding the
gross sexual imposition conviction of a driver's education teacher who l(,ndlcd students who were
fitieen and a half years old); State v. Hainey, 2003 WL 21302993 (Tenn. Crim. App. june 6, 2003)
(upholding the conviction of a principal, who also served as the girl's basketball coach, on seven
counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and eleven counts of statutory rape f(>r his sexual
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harassment statutes, 4 contract law, 5 "educational malpractice," 6 and
recently under the vague and uncertain equitable concept of fiduciary
duty. 7
While there is nothing new about teachers, administrators, and
schools thinking about their relationships with students and parents as
deeply infused with responsibilities and obligations, historically these
duties were not thought of in overtly legal terms.x Now, however, a
number of courts and commentators have suggested that the studentteacher relationship is a fiduciary relationship, carrying legal obligations
and potential liability for misconduct. 9
This article addresses two related questions. First, to what extent and
under what circumstances does it make sense to characterize and treat
the relationship of students with teachers, administrators, and
educational institutions as a fiduciary relationship with legally enforced
duties? Second, under what circumstances are teachers and educational
institutions more or less likely to be considered to have breached a
relationship with a tenth grade student).
3. See Hubbard v. Canton City Sch. Bd. o(Educ., 780 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Ohio 2002) (holding
that a city school board of education was not immune from liability on negligent retention and
supervision claim asserted by parent of middle school students in connection with alleged sexual
assaults on those students by a teacher on school premises); Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (fla.
1982) (holding that a school could be liable f{>r a tort committed by a student on the school grounds).
4.

See e.g. Mandsagcr v. U. of N. C., 269 f. Supp. 2d 662, 678-79 (M.ll.N.C:. 2003) (holding

that graduate student alleged sufficient facts to establish university's liability l(>r subjecting her to a
sexually '""tile environment resulting hom professor's sexual harassment).
5. See e.g. Peretti v. Montana, 464 f. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979) (analyzing duties
between college and students under rubric of contract law, and noting that "the general nature and
terms of the agreement are usually implied, with specific terms to be fillmd in the university bulletin
and other publications; custom and usages can also become specific terms by implication"), rcv'd,
661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981) (the case was reversed on a provivion of Montana\ Constitution
regarding a waiver of immunity, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the contract chum).
6. A majority of states do not recognize a cause of action fi>r "educational malpractice." Kent
Weeks and Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and Administrators, 29

].C. & U.l.. 153, 156 (2002). See e.g. Ross v. Creighton University, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting student athlete's claim that the university committed malpractice by f<liling to provide a
meaningful education and prepare him f(>r employment).
7.

See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F.

Supp. 2d <JO (Conn. 2000).
8. This trend towards seeking juriscentric solutions to a wide range of social problems and
frictions is in no way unique to the educational setting. Many commentators have expressed concern
about the trend towards seeking legal solutions to every type of problem in every type of relationship.
Sec Zuckerman, supra n. 1; Philip K. Howard, The Collapse of the C.o11lrnon Good: How America's
Lawsuit Culture Undermines Our Freedom (Ballantine 2002); Philip K. Howard, !Jeuth of Common
Sense: How Law Is Suffocating America (G.K. Hall & Co. 1995).
9. Sec generally Melissa Astala, Wronged by a Professor' Breach of" Fiduciary IJuty as a
Remedy in Intellectual Property Cases, 3 Houston Bus. & Tax!..]. 31 (2003); Ro/Jert P. Schuwerk, The
Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 45 S. !'ex. I.. Rev. 753 (20tl4):
Weeks & Haglund, supra n. ti.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF EDUCATORS

159]

161

fiduciary duty?
In Part II of this study we will discuss the concept of fiduciary duty,
the range of relationships to which this idea applies, and the doctrinal
approaches usually taken in analyzing alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.
We argue that while these doctrinal approaches are important, they are
remarkably unhelpful in providing guidance in assessing and predicting
the circumstances in which a court will find that there has been a breach
of fiduciary duty. In Part III we introduce and develop a new framework
for assessing the likelihood that a court will find a fiduciary duty to exist,
and whether there has been a breach of that duty. This new analytic
framework focuses upon a number of factors that courts use in a wide
array of situations and relationships to assess first, whether a fiduciary
relationship exists and if so whether the magnitude of duty owed by a
particular fiduciary to a particular beneficiary is relatively large or small,
and second, whether the magnitude of an alleged breach is large or small.
In Part IV we apply this new framework for assessing the magnitude of
duties and breaches to four areas in which courts have been asked to hold
teachers or educational institutions liable as fiduciaries: (i) the evaluation
and grading of students; (ii) professor-student research relationships; (iii)
patents and other intellectual property; and (iv) sexual harassment. We
conclude in Part V that teachers, educational institutions, attorneys, and
courts will be able to assess alleged violations of fiduciary duty more
effectively by applying this analytical framework to asserted violations of
fiduciary duty.
II.

A.

THE CONCEPT OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

What It Means to Be a Fiduciary

Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary as "one who owes to
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor." 10 The
word "fiduciary" stems from several Latin terms, including fides, 11 or
faith, 12 which represented the conscience of the people, their morals,n

10. Black's Law Dictionary640 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999) [hereinafter Black's].
II. David Cowan Bayne, The Philosophy of Corporate Control: A Treatise on the Law of
Fiduciary lJuty 36 (Loyola U. Press 1986); The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 380 (Robert K.
Barnhart ed., H.W. Wilson 1988) [hereinafter Barnhart]; The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology

354 (C.T. Onions ed., Oxford U. Press 1966) [hereinafter Oxford].
12. Black's, supra n. 10, at 640; see also Barnhart, supra n. II, at 380; Bayne, supra n. 11, at 36;
Oxford, supra note II, at 354.
13.
1951 ).

Hans Julius Woltl~ }(oman Law: An Historical Introduction 65, 74-75 (U. of Okla. Press

1LVVJ

and their trust or confidence, 14 and the term fiducia, 15 meaning a
"position of trust," 16 or "in trust." 17 While rooted in concepts such as
good faith, trust, and confidence, the duties that courts have categorized
under the rubric of fiduciary duty are many and varied, and are often
described in very lofty terms. These duties include the duty not to
commit fraud, not to engage in self-dealing, to be loyal, obedient,
diligent, and exercise good faith, to disclose material information, and to
exercise care and prudence, among others.
For example, in perhaps the most well-known case ever decided
about fiduciary duty, Meinhard v. Salmon, Judge Cardozo explained:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule
of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously
be lowered by any judgment of this court. 1H
While courts often resort to strongly normative language in
describing fiduciary duties, in practice they are often much less
demanding in the degree of selflessness and competence required of
fiduciaries than their rhetoric would suggest. For example, in the
Meinhard case, Judge Cardozo suggests that the managing coadventurer
might have fulfilled his fiduciary duties merely by disclosing a business
opportunity to his co-adventurer, and then letting him compete for it. 1Y
As a further example, in the case of directors of corporations, the

14. Rayne, supra n. 11, at 36-37.
15. Barnhart, supra n. 11, at 3HO; Bayne, supra 11. II, at 36; Oxf(lrd, supra 11. 11, at 354; Frnest
Vinter, A Treatise on the History and Law of Fiduciary l<clationship m1d l<csulting Trusts I (3d ed.,
Cambridge 1955).
16. Vi11ter, supra n. 15, at 1.

Sec e.g. id.
A1einhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,547 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
19. Td at 547 ("[Salmon]might have warned Mcinhard that the plan had been submitted, and

I 7.

JR.

that either would be free to compete f(Jr the award. If he had done this, we do not need to say
whether he would have been under a duty, if successful in the competition, to hold the lease so
acquired for the benefit of a venture than about to end, and thus prolong by indirection ih
responsibilities and duties. The trouble about his conduct is that he excluded his coadventurer from
any chance to compete .... "). A duty to disclose and compete, however, would appear to be much
less demanding than Cardozo's earlier rhetoric (a "duty of the finest loyalty," a "punctilio oC an
honor the most sensitive," and "undivided loyalty") might lead one to believe.
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business judgment rule provides a presumption that directors act
honestly, in good faith, and in an informed manner that is in the best
interests of the corporation, 20 which creates a safe harbor that may shield
directors from judgments that are mistaken, 21 or even egregiously
stupid. 22 Thus, focusing on the morally charged language employed by
judges in discussing fiduciary duties can create a misleading impression
that all fiduciaries owe high magnitude duties in all situations, and that
all fiduciaries will be held fully liable for the consequences of even low
magnitude breaches of duty. The reality is much more complicated, as
cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by educators bear out.

B.

Fiduciary Relationships and Duties

Fiduciary duty is a concept that applies to a large variety of
relationships in almost every imaginable precinct of law and life,
including a trustee and beneficiary, a guardian and ward, an agent and
principal, a lawyer and client, a member of the clergy and a parishioner, a
director and a corporation, a partner and the other partners, an employer
and an employee, and a broker and client. Indeed, the number of
potential fiduciary relationships is continuously expanding/ 3 and today
sometimes includes the relationship of teachers, educators, and
educational institutions and their students.
The concept is further complicated by the fact that fiduciary duties
arise under a broad array of laws, including a variety of federal statutes,
state statutes, and the common law. Add to this the literally thousands of
cases decided by courts involving alleged violations of fiduciary duty, and
the law of fiduciary duty is by any measure an exceedingly complex and
nuanced area of the law.
C.

Teachers and Educators as Fiduciaries

Historically, the association of teachers and their students has been
viewed as a fiduciary relationship. 24 Over the past thirty years, however,
20. See e.g. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. I 'IR4).
21. See e.g. Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (S. Ct. 1'176), af(d, 387 N.Y.S.2d
9'13 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1'176).
22. See hz re Caremark Inti. Inc. Derivative Litig., 6'18 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1'196)
("[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,' provides no
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process empl0yed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.")
23. Bennet v. Hodge, 29 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 1940); Studybaker v. Cofield, 61 S.W.2d 246, 250
(Mo. 1901); Peckham v. johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408,416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); see also Ceorge c;lcason
Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees§ 7, 29 (2d ed., West 1984).
24. See e.g. Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students; "Due Process", 70 Haz-v. 1.. J(cv. 1406,
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the pendulum, given momentum by cor~cern for student privacy and
free-speech rights, swung dramatically towards viewing this relationship
as one defined by rights (primarily of students) rather than duties. ~ In
recent years, fueled perhaps by the events of Columbine and other highprofile incidents, the pendulum has begun to swing back towards viewing
the relationship as a trust concept defined by duties (of teachers and
schools), as well as rights. It seems likely that the concept of fiduciary
duty will play a growing role in the legal and moral assessment of
educational relationships in the future.
Courts and commentators have identified a wide variety of fiduciary
duties that teachers and educational institutions might owe to students,
including a duty to provide an educational environment free of sexual
harassment, 26 duties arising from the services provided by a university's
faculty and staff as advisors to undergraduate students, 27 and duties
governing the conduct of dissertation advisers and committees towards
graduate students. 2x
2

D.

The Doctrinal Approaches to Analyzing Fiduciary Duties

The usual approach employed by U.S. courts and commentators for
analyzing fiduciary duties focuses upon established doctrines and
concepts. In its most basic form, the doctrinal approach first asks
whether someone is a fiduciary, and if so who the beneficiaries of that
fiduciary's duties are. Thus, the threshold question is whether or not a
fiduciary relationship exists. In order for there to be a fiduciary
relationship, there must be an element of entrustment by one person (the
J 407 n. 3 ( J957) ("Since schools exist primarily for the education of their students, it is obvious that
professors cmd administrators act in a fiduciary capacity with reference to the students.").
25. Sec Tinker v. Des Moines lndcp. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 ( 1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
nr expression at the schoolhouse gate."). Tinker significantly undermined the historic authority of
schools, administrators, and teachers to make and enforce rules controlling student behavior. See
Kelly Frels, Balancing Students' Rights and Schools' Responsibilities, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 117, 119-20
{2000). In the 1970s, Tinker provided the foundation for several cases regarding students' rights,
including the right to distribute literature on campus, see e.g Trachtman v. Anker, 563 1'.2d 512,516
(2d Cir. 1977); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); to use
"indecent speech" in school newspapers and at student assemblies, see Pap ish v. Bd. of' Curators, 410
U.S. 667, 671 (1973); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 47R U.S. 675 ( 19R6); Pap ish v. Bd. of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667,670 (1973); to wear long hair, see e.g. Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 7R3 (4th
Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d !On9, 1075 (Rth Cir. 1971), to boycott and skip classes, sec e.g.
Dunn v. Tyler lndep. Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 137, 146-47 (5th C:ir. 1972), and to hold demonstrations on
school grounds during the school day, see e.g. Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate Sch. Dis I., 594 F.2d
433,437 (5th Cor. 1979); see Frels, supra n. 25, at 120-21.

26. Weeks & Haglund, supra n. 6, at 154.
27.

Id.

2H.

Jd.
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beneficiary) to another (the fiduciary), an element of power and control
by the fiduciary over the interests and well-being of the beneficiary, and
an element of proactivity and protection where under the fiduciary
subordinates her own interests in order to pursue and protect the
interests of the beneficiary.
If a fiduciary relationship exists, the doctrinal approach then asks (i)
what duties the fiduciary owes to the beneficiaries (e.g., duty of loyalty,
duty of care, duty of disclosure); and (ii) whether the fiduciary has
breached any of those duties (e.g., through a conflict of interest, gross
negligence, or failure to disclose material information).
With so many relationships characterized as fiduciary relationships,
and with so many distinctly identifiable fiduciary duties, it may be
surprising that courts are not more aggressive in finding breaches of
fiduciary duty. But fiduciary concepts apply in different ways in different
areas of the law and in different situations within a particular area of the
law. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "To say that a man is
a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?" 2Y
Enquiries about alleged breaches of fiduciary duty involve highly detailed
factual analyses of a wide array of factors that affect the magnitude of
duty and magnitude of breach in a given situation.

E.

The Inadequacy of Traditional Doctrinal Approaches

The formulaic application of doctrinal categories often does as much
to obfuscate as it does to illuminate the likely outcome of a particular
case. Doctrinal approaches, while valuable, often do not seem to give
much guidance as to whether or not liability will result from an alleged
breach of duty. In the educational context, for example, sometimes courts
conclude that the relationship between a teacher and a student is a
fiduciary relationship, 311 and sometimes courts conclude that it is not a
fiduciary relationship. 31 In addition, at times a court will conclude that
specific behavior constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, while another
court will conclude that apparently very similar behavior is not a breach
of fiduciary duty. 32 It is tempting to throw up one's arms in despair at

29. Securities and Exch. Commn. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (l 943).
30. See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d
90 (Conn. 2000).
31. Andre v. Pace U., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1996); Ho v. U. of Tex. at
Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998); Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106,
108 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1'!80).

32. Compare Chou, 254 F.3d at 1347 with U. of' W. Va. v. Van Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).

V._l_.\....1,
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finding any rhyme or reason to the myriad of cases with conflicting and
difficult to reconcile results. Such a temptation, however, should be
resisted, at least unless we really are certain that there are no underlying
organizing principles that operate in this area of the law.
Focusing exclusively upon whether a fiduciary relationship exists,
and whether a particular duty has been breached is often not particularly
helpful in trying to determine whether a court is likely to find that there
has been an actionable breach of fiduciary duty. As Arthur R. Pinto and
Douglas M. Branson explain, "While [fiduciary] duty is described in
terms of these two categories of care and loyalty, there is in fact a sliding
scale of duty because some cases fall between those duties. As the
[Delaware l Supreme Court indicated in Guth v. Loft, fiduciary duty is
subject to "no fixed scale." 33
III.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE MAGNITUDE OF
DUTIES AND BREACHES

An analysis of cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a
broad array of relationships and in many areas of the law reveals that the
law in practice, if not always in doctrine, has an extremely nuanced,
subtle, and sophisticated approach to evaluating claims of breach of
fiduciary duty. 34 Courts in nearly every imaginable jurisdiction have
decided numerous cases concerning fiduciary duty/" including a
surprisingly large number of cases that assess the claim that teachers or
educational institutions have violated a fiduciary duty.'" Collectively, a
close reading of cases alleging breaches of fiduciary duty suggests that
there are perhaps as many as thirty factors that courts routinely take into
account when determining whether the particular duties owed by a
fiduciary in a particular situation are of a high or low magnitude, and
whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty, and if so whether that
breach is large or small. While courts' consideration of these factors is by
no means systematic, a study of numerous cases involving a wide variety

33. Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson, Understanding Corporate Law 182 (LexisNexis
1999) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1961)).

34. We are working on an article about quantifying the magnitude of fiduciary duties and
their breach in a wide array of fiduciary relationships. A draft of the article, tentatively titled, "A
General Theory of Fiduciary Relativity," is on file with the authors.
35. For example, in a Westlaw search of the fifty state courts in the United States, the phrase
"fiduciary duty" appears in over 27,400 cases. Search of Westlaw, ALI.STATES database (Jan. 17,
2005).

36. In the same directory, over 550 cases include the phrase "fiduciary duty" in the same
paragraph with words like teacher, educator, school, university, or professor. Search of 'vV cstlaw,
At.ISTATFS database (Jan. 17, 2005).
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of types of fiduciary relationships in a wide variety of contexts reveals a
number of criteria and considerations that courts predictably and
regularly utilize.
We propose that in determining the likelihood of legal liability for an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, one should engage in three inter-related
enquiries. (l) The first enquiry involves considering and analyzing a set
of f~lCtors and indicia to determine whether a fiduciary relationship
between two parties exists and, more importantly, the magnitude of duty
that arises within that particular relationship and context. 37 Such an
enquiry helps determine whether a fiduciary in a particular situation
owes a relatively high or relatively low degree of duty. (2) The second
enquiry involves analyzing a related set of factors and indicia that will
help determine the height or degree of the fiduciary's behavior. (3) The
third step is to measure the amplitude of the fiduciary's performance to
determine the extent to which that conduct exceeded or fell short of the
required level of performance.'x If there has been a shortfall or breach of
duty, this enquiry then determines the amount or type of appropriate
remedies. This step also considers how easy or difficult it would have
been for the fiduciary to fulfill his or her duty, whether there are any
special reasons why a court should not get involved in second guessing
the fiduciary or substituting its judgment for that of the fiduciary, and
whether there is an available remedy that would be appropriate in
rectifying or at least ameliorating the effects of the breach of duty. 39
This approach to analyzing fiduciary duties is helpful in several ways.
It inherently recognizes that all fiduciary duties are not created equal, and
that all breaches will not be regarded as equally harmful. 411 For example,
by conducting this type of analysis we learn that courts are most likely to
find liability in cases involving duties of a high magnitude coupled with
breaches of a high magnitude and where there is an available appropriate
remedy. Conversely, if a low-degree duty is coupled with a low-degree
breach and there is no remedy that seems appropriate for the situation,
courts are unlikely to impose legal liability. Cases involving a high degree
of duty and a low degree breach, or cases involving a low degree duty and
a serious breach prove to be the most difficult situations in which to
)/

Infra, Part II I.A .

.>H.

ln/m, Part II I. B.
Inji-a, Part IILC.

.W

·10. As Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson explain, "While [fiduciary] duty is described
in terms of [the] categories oi care and loyalty, there is in fact a sliding scale of duty because some
cases t1ll between those duties. As the [Delaware] Supreme Court indicated in the Guth case
iiduciary duty is subject to 'no fixed scale."'
Arthur R. Pinto and Douglas M. Branson,
Understanding Corporate J.aw I H2 (LexisNexis I'!'!'!) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1%1))
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predict outcomes; but even in such cases, the approach outlined below
allows lawyers, judges, and litigants to identify and produce all the
evidence systematically relevant to a sound resolution of the case. In all
cases, this approach identifies specific, quantifiable elements that allow
judges, lawyers, and administrators to marshal the evidence and make
reasonable judgments in calculating the magnitude of duty owed and the
degree of violation of duty that may have occurred.
This analytical approach is also helpful in answering important
doctrinal questions such as: What standard of review should a court
apply to an alleged breach? Which party should bear the burden of
proof? If there is a high magnitude duty, then a court is more likely to
require defendants to bear the burden of proof that their performance
was satisfactory. On the other hand, if the magnitude of duty is relatively
low, courts will be more likely to require the plaintiff to bear the burden
of proof. In determining the proper standard of review, if there is a large
breach, it is unlikely that a strong presumption of propriety (such as that
afforded by the business judgment rule) in favor of the fiduciary will
apply. On the other hand, if there is only a small alleged breach, the
plaintiff will more likely be required to bear the burden of proof before
liability will be found.
This analytic framework is useful in evaluating a broad array of
fiduciary relationships and is particularly helpful in the complex and
multifaceted area of evaluating alleged breaches of duty by teachers and
educators. Without such a framework, the cases may seem confusing or
inconsistent since an overly simplistic application of doctrines such as
"duty of care" and "duty of loyalty" may result in outcomes that are
difficult to explain or reconcile with other decisions. When the
underlying questions of magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach are
considered, however, an underlying consistency and coherence in the
decisions begins to come into focus, albeit of an imperfect and sometimes
contestable nature.
As is the case in each unique context, some of the factors that
contribute to an analysis of the magnitude of duties and the magnitude of
breaches are of particular significance in the educational setting. For
example, in assessing magnitude of duties and breaches in the
educational context, the following considerations are often important:
the degree of actual power or control entrusted to the fiduciary, the age
and vulnerability of the beneficiary, the experience and sophistication of
both the fiduciary and the beneficiary, the formality in the creation of the
agreement between the fiduciary and beneficiary, the history and
duration of the relationship, the degree and cause of reliance in a
relationship, the divergence of interests between the fiduciary and
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beneficiary, and the specificity of duty, among others.
The following section outlines the main factors and considerations
that courts take into account in determining (A) the magnitude of duty,
and (B) the magnitude of an alleged breach. Each of these many factors
and considerations can become pertinent in any given case. Before
turning to the application of these factors in educational settings, this
section will also consider briefly (C) the availability and formulation of
appropriate remedies.

A.

Quantifying the Magnitude of Duty Owed

After determining that there is prima facie evidence that a fiduciary
relationship exists, 41 the first step in analyzing an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty should be to quantify the magnitude of duty that exists in a
particular case or situation. Four broad considerations are relevant to a
determination of whether a relatively high or relatively low degree of
duty is owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary: (1) the characteristics of
the parties, both the fiduciary and the beneficiary in absolute as well as
relative terms; (2) the characteristics of the relationship between the
fiduciaries and beneficiaries; (3) the characteristics of the subject matter
of the alleged breach, including the significance of the event in question,
the value of the entrustment at stake, and the public importance of the
matter; and (4) the underlying source of the legal action. Many of these
considerations exist on a continuum, with one end of the continuum
corresponding to a higher degree of duty and the other end of the
continuum corresponding to a lower degree of duty.
1.

Characteristics of the Parties

The first group of factors in quantifying the magnitude of duty that a
fiduciary owes a beneficiary relate to the respective characteristics of the
parties. These characteristics are significant both in an absolute sense,
and when comparing the relative characteristics of the fiduciary and
beneficiary.
a.

The Fiduciary

A number of characteristics of fiduciaries themselves are relevant to
determining the degree of duty to which the fiduciary will be held. Most
41. Prima facie evidence that a fiduciary relationship exists will be based upon a
determination that there has been an element of entrustment by one person (the beneficiary) to
another (the t!duciary), an clement of power and control by the fiduciary over the interests and wellbeing of the beneficiary, and an element of proactivity and protection under which the fiduciary
subordinates her own interests in order to pursue and protect the interests of the beneficiary.

172

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2005

Similarly, if an alleged breach of duty takes place within a sphere
of conduct where a fiduciary has a high degree of power and
control, it is more likely that a high degree of duty will be
found. 50 On the other hand, fiduciaries with relatively little
power are subject to comparatively lower degrees of duty. A
teacher or educator with a high degree of actual power or control
over a student will more likely be found to have a high degree of
duty. 51 In contrast, if a teacher has relatively little control over a
student, or is closely supervised and has little control over
curricular and other choices, and is acting within the scope of his
authority, it is more likely that he will be held to a lower degree
of duty.

• Degree of Delegated Fiduciary Discretion: (high, medium, low).
Closely related to power is discretion, which also exists on a
continuum. A fiduciary who has a high degree of discretion in
how he performs is more likely to be deemed to have a relatively
high magnitude of duty. 52 In contrast, a fiduciary who operates in
Ill. Dec 23, 2003) ("The common law imposes [a fiduciary duty] when the disparity between the
parties in knowledge or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a
reasonable inference that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they would
have agreed thai the agent owed the principal the high duty that we have dc,cribcd, because
otherwise the principal would be placing himself at the agent's mercy." (citing Burdett v. Millrr, 957
F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992))); In re Tramco/or Corp., 296 B.R. 343, 372 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003)
("As the party in control of both Alleco and Tramcolor, Lapides owed a fiduciary duty to NCB as
trustee"); D'Addario v. Geller, 264 !'. Supp. 2d 367, 395 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[l]t appears clear to the
court that Florida state law imposes a fiduciary duty on corporate officers who control the
corporation through ownership of a majority of the stock." (citing Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So.
2d 618, 619 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1981))). In contrast, if a fiduciary has a relatively low amount of
actual power or control, it is less likely that he will be found in breach of a tlduciary duty. Baker v.
Kingsley, 294 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that certain Management Committee
members were not fiduciaries as to a funding plan because of a lack of power or control "with respect
to the investment of the plan's assets or the plan's funding"), rev'd and remanded, F.3d 649,664 (7th
Cir. 2004); In re Estate of King, 2003 WL 21946723 at '2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. II, 2003) (finding that
an executor and benet!ciary of a will did not have sufficient power or control over the decedent to
give rise to a fiduciary duty).
50. Vikell Investors Panjic, Inc. v. Hampden, Ltd., 946 P.2d 589, 596-597 (Colo. App. 1997)
("A fiduciary relationship generally arises when one party has a high degree of control over the
property or subject matter of another, when the benefiting party places a high level of trust and
cont!dcnce in the fiduciary to look out for the beneficiary's best interest, or when one party relies on
another's high degree of expertise in an area.") (citing Hailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339
(Colo. App. 1992).
51. See e.g. Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 1'. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D. Conn. 2000) (denying a motion to
dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim, brought by a graduate student against his dissertation
advisors and Yale University for misappropriating his dissertation ideas, on the basis that a fiduciary
relationship might be established since the advisors and the university were "in a position of power
and authority" over him).
52. See McAdams v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287, 303 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
question of whether one party owes fiduciary duties to another is a question of fact. [A] [k]ey
factor ... in this fact-specific inquiry include\s] ... whether one party has granted another party a
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a tightly bounded environment with little discretion will more
likely be found to have a relatively low magnitude of duty. We
would expect that the degree of discretion that a teacher or
educator enjoys would have a predictable effect on the
magnitude of duty that such a teacher or educator will be
deemed to have.

Dominance of One Fiduciary Over Other Fiduciaries: (high,
medium, low). Sometimes fiduciaries act as a group, such as the
board of directors of a corporation. In such a situation, if a
particular fiduciary among a group of fiduciaries exerts a
dominant influence over the others, it is common for that
fiduciary to be held to have a relatively higher degree of duty. 5 3 In
contrast, a fiduciary who is dominated rather than the dominator
may be held to have a lower degree of duty, although such a
fiduciary will not be absolved from all duty and will not be
allowed to cite alleged powerlessness as an excuse for abject
failures or abdications of duty. We would expect in the
educational context as well, that a fiduciary, such as a powerful
school administrator or department chair, who dominates other
fiduciaries will be held to have a higher degree of duty.
• Amount of Compensation Received by Fiduciary: (high,
medium, low, none). As a general rule, highly compensated
fiduciaries are likely to be deemed to have a comparatively
greater degree of duty than fiduciaries who receive no significant
monetary compensation. 54 Even fiduciaries who are not paid at
great deal of discretion.") (citation omitted); U.S. v. Britt, 388 F3d 1369, 1372 (lith Cir. 2004)
(holding that because of her broad discretion and loose supervision, a part-time clerk with the Social
Security Administration had a fiduciary relationship necessary to find an abuse of a position of
trust); Ohio Civ. Serv. Employees Assn., AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO v. St. Empl. Relations Bd., 759
N.F.. 2d 794, 798~799 (Ohio App. lOth Dist. 2001) ("the authority to make discretionary investment
and banking decisions shows a 'highly fiduciary' relationship." (citing State ex ref Charlton v.
Corrigan, 521 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio 1988))); Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1'J71)
(finding that trustees who had considerable discretion to manage the trust breached the fiduciary
obligation to maximize trust income by prudent investment); see also In re Enron Corp., 2003 WL
1562202 at '16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003) (recognizing that "the authority to usc estate
property in the ordinary course of business confers upon the debtor the corresponding discretion to
exercise reasonable judgment in ordinary affairs bounded only the debtor's fiduciary duties").
53. See e.g. In re Abrams, 229 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1999) ("'n reviewing the line
of cases that gave rise to the rule in Texas that the managing partner of a partnership owes to his
copartners the highest fiduciary obligations known at law, it is clear that the issue of control has
always heen the critical fact looked to by the courts in imposing this high level of responsibility."
(citing In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 789 (5th Cir. 1993))); Hujji11gton v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576,
579 (Tex. 1976) (holding that a managing partner "owed to his copartners one of the highest
fiduciaries recognized in the law" and quoting justice Cardozo's comments concerning managing
fiduciaries in Mei11hard v. Salmon, 164 1\:.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) where he stated that '"[flor [managing
coadventurers] the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme"').
54. See Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, 758 F.2d 86, 97 (3d Cir. I 985)
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all, however, may be viewed as having violated their fiduciary
duties, especially if there are other indicia that suggest a relatively
high magnitude duty or high magnitude breach. The level of
compensation of a teacher, professor, educator, or administrator
will likely be a relevant factor in determining the degree of duty
to which the individual will be held. We would also expect as a
general matter that volunteers in an educational setting will be
held to a lower degree of duty than paid professionals.

• Other Roles of Fiduciary: (full-time, part-time). If a fiduciary
serves in a full-time capacity, it is more likely she will be held to a
high degree of duty. 55 In contrast, if a fiduciary has a host of
unrelated responsibilities, interests, or opportunities, a lower
degree of duty may be applied. 56 We would expect this general
consideration to apply in the educational context in a similar
way, with full-time educational professionals being held to a
higher degree of duty than part-time employees.

(Wcis, J., dissenting) (arguing that lawyers who did not give adequate notice of an antitrust class
action settlement "were not only fiduciaries, but well compensated ones as well") (majority did not
look at amount of compensation and found they did not breach any fiduciary relationship); In rc Est.
of Maurice, 249 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. 1969) (finding that beneficiaries had grounds t()r their claim of
surcharge against the executor who had overpaid taxes, because "[ijt is only reasonable and logical to
expect that services so well compensated for should have been performed in a careful and skillful
manner") (emphasis added); Compare with Sweickley Township Volunteer Fire Co. No.3 v. First Nat'/
Bank of Herminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 297, 299-300 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. 1990) (finding that volunteer
fire fighters did not have a fiduciary duty as there is a lower standard for "people like the officers and
directors of a non-protlt fire company, who serve the public without compensation and who,
therefore, should not be held to the same standard as those who serve profit-making entities and
derive remuneration for their services."). Some courts aftlrmatively reject the suggestion that
compensation should be a factor in assessing magnitude of duty. See e.g. Matter of Neuschwander,
747 P.2d 104, 106 (Kan. 1987) ("The fact that [the non-profit corporation's] directors and officers
served as volunteers without compensation does not reduce the fiduciary duty owed to the
corporation."); Atty. Grievance Commn. v. Silk, 369 A.2d 70, 71 (Md. 1977) ("[T]here appears to be
no sound reason for regarding misappropriations committed in a non-professional capacity more
leniently than those committed in a professional capacity. Each involves a breach of trust or of a
fiduciary relationship and bear equally on the fitness of a lawyer to practice his profession.").
55. See T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 147o, 1486-1487 (D. Colo. 1991)
(finding and emphasizing that a former, "full-time" employee violated his fiduciary duty by
competing with his f(Jrmer employer).
56. Sec e.g. BEP, Inc. v. Atkinson, 174 F. Supp. 2d 400, 409 (D. Md. 2001) (finding defendant
"was merely a part time employee and owed no fiduciary duty by competing with his former
employer"); Sweickley Township Vol. Fire Co. No.3 v. First Nat/. Rank ofHerminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th
297, 299-300 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. 1990) (finding that volunteer fire fighters did not breach any
fiduciary duty); but see U.S. v. Britt, 388 F.3d 1369, 1370 (II th Cir. 2004) (rejecting defendant's
argument that her part-time status as a clerk for the Social Security Administration excluded her
from a fiduciary relationship, on the basis that her high degree of discretion and loose supervision
was suftlcient to place her in a position of trust).
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(b) The Beneficiary
Characteristics of the beneficiary are also relevant to determining the
degree of duty that a fiduciary will owe a beneficiary. Courts often focus
upon the following characteristics:
Number and Uniqueness of Beneficiaries: (large, medium,
small). In general, if there is a large number of beneficiaries, such
as in a large public corporation, fiduciaries will have a relatively
high degree of duty. ' 7 If, however, the number of beneficiaries is
small, but their needs are great or distinctive, then the fact that a
fiduciary fails to tailor his services to those needs may also be
relevant to an assessment of degree of duty. In the education
context, we would expect the number of beneficiaries to be quite
a complex factor in evaluating the magnitude of duty. A teacher
of a small class of students for whom that teacher has primary
responsibility might be held to a relatively high degree of duty,
while a teacher who has less exposure to a much larger number
of students might have a lower degree of duty. On the other
hand, the expectations of an administrator who is responsible for
a large school or district might be higher than those of an
administrator with a smaller stewardship.
Age of Beneficiaries: (aged, adult, young adult, adolescent,
minor children, infants). The age of beneficiaries is also often a
factor in assessing the degree of duty, particularly when the
number of beneficiaries is relatively small and the similarities
<Among the beneficiaries is high. Duties owed to inLmts, minor
children, adolescents, young adults, adults, aged, and the infirm
will vary according to the needs and capacities of the
beneficiaries.'x In general, a higher degree of duty will be owed to

57. Sec Felix v. Lucent 'J'cchnologics, Inc., Jll7 F.3d 1116 (lOth Cir. 2004) (noting the large
number, v·ulnerability, and reliance of plan beneficiaries who were impacted hy a company merger
decision in considering an ERISA preemption of employees' claims); ()VC Network, inc. v.
l'aramount Co11unun. Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 126() (Del. C:h. 19<J3) (finding that the board of directors
had breached their duty to shareholders of a large public company by not becoming fully inl(mned
during change of control negotiations); Lewis v. Hmzqwc/1, Inc., I <Jll7 W f. 14747 at ' 2 (Del. Ch. ) uly
2H, l<JK7) ("By reason of the director defendants' positions within the Company, they are in fiduciary
relatiomhips with plaintiff and the other class members [shareholders] and owe to them the highest
obligations of good titith and litir dealing. The director defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties to the Comp;my's public shareholders .... ").

SK Sec US. 1'. Sanden, 4lll'ed. Appx. 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) ("[T]he purpose
of appointing a conservator is 'to preserve the estate of an incompell'nt or disabled perwn.' ... [A]
comcrvator 'shall have the same duties and powers as a guardian of a minor, and all laws related to
the guardianship of a minor shall be applicable to a conservator.' 'A conservator occupies a fiduciary
position of trust of the highest and most sacred character." (quoting Folts v. jones, 132 S. W.2d 205,
20K (Tenn. l<J3<J))); Moose v. U.S., 674 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. I':Ji\2) (reversing the lower courts ruling
that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims by minor Indian children against the united States
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very young and very old beneficiaries. We would expect the age
of beneficiaries to be a significant factor in the educational
context, where the types and magnitude of duties owed to
children in day care or pre-school situations will vary from the
duties owed to elementary, secondary, high school, college, and
graduate level students. 5Y For example, one area where teachers,
professors and other educators are often accused of fiduciary
malfeasance involves sexual relationships with students. We
would expect the magnitude of duty surrounding sexual relations
with students would be much higher when dealing with minors
than with adults, and even when dealing with adults, we would
expect a higher degree of duty would attend younger adults in
comparison with older adults.
• Experience and Sophistication of Beneficiaries: (high, medium,
low). Closely related to age is the experience and sophistication
of beneficiaries. Courts often consider this as a separate factor,
however, since chronological age is an imperfect proxy for
ascertaining experience and sophistication. In general, fiduciaries
will owe a greater degree of duty to beneficiaries who are
relatively inexperienced or unsophisticated. 60 In the educational

government t(Jr mismanagement of a fund created to pay a judgment intended to compensate Indian
children's tribe for the loss of their homeland. The court found that the government did hold the
judgment in trust for the children and reversed for determination on breach); Richcl/c L. v. lioman
Catholic Archbishop, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 273 (lst Disl. 2003) ("The vulnerability that is the
necessary predicate of a confidential [or fiduciary] relation ... usually arises from advanced age,
youth, lack of education, weakness of mind, grief, sickness, or some other incapacity." (intenul
citation omitted)).
5'1. See e.g. Ward v. Greene, 2001 WL 358873 at "6-7 (Conn. Super. Mar. 20, 2001)
(recognizing the fiduciary relationship and duty of a day care provider, who liJtally c1buscd a twoyear-old, and a child placement agency, which failed repeatedly to report previous cases of abuse by
the provider); Drueding v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 482 So. 2d 83, 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1'186)
(fmding that supervisors at day care nurseries are "charged with the highest duty of care toward
children placed in their custody" and that "supervising teachers must t(>llow a reasonable standard of
care commensurate with the age of the children under the attendant circumstances").
60. See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 884, 8S8 (E. D. Mich. 1978) (contrasting
sick, elderly plaintiffs in cases finding fiduciary relationships with a plaintiff who had "extensive
education, experience, and presumed sophistication"); Stokes v. Henson, 265 Cal. H.ptr. 836, 195-96
(App. 4th Dist. 1990) (holding that Henson breached his fiduciary duty to "unsophisticated"
investors and knew as much); Bero Motors v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2001 WI. 1167533 at • 5 (Mich. App.
Oct. 2, 20tll) (finding no fiduciary relationship where "the parties' existing and continued
relationship was driven by profits" against "a commercial backdrop where sophisticated commercial
entities . . regulate the minutiae of their relationship through written contracts"); Moore v. Gregory,
131 S.E. 692, 706 (Va. 1926) (finding that a tiduciary relationship existed between an heir and the
other parties in the transaction of his uncle's will, because the other parties "occupied a position of
superiority and influence over the [heir], on account of the confidence he naturally reposed in them
by reason of ties of relationship, age, and superior intelligence and experience" and because the heir
"had barely reached his majority, was merely a colkge student, and had no business or legal training
or experience").
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context, as with age, we would expect courts to be quite sensitive
to the experience and sophistication of students, both in an
absolute sense, and also in comparison to their teachers and
other fiduciaries.r' 1 For example, in cases involving alleged sexual
misconduct of teachers, the experience and sophistication of
students is likely to be considered by courts, although not always
explicitly or directly.
Vulnerability of Beneficiaries: (high, medium, low). Another
related factor is the vulnerability of beneficiaries. A high degree
of beneficiary vulnerability will correlate with a high degree of
duty, whereas beneficiaries who are not particularly vulnerable
will correlate with a lower degree of duty being owed to them. 62
In cases involving alleged breaches of duty by educators, we
would expect vulnerability to be a relevant consideration,
especially in the pre-collegiate context, where the age and
experience of students, as well as mental, physical and emotional
handicaps, might be relevant to an assessment of the degree of
duty. 61
•

2.

Characteristics of the Relationship

In addition to the characteristics of the parties, the characteristics of
the relationship between a fiduciary and beneficiary are also important in
determining the magnitude of duty of fiduciaries. Courts consider a
number of features of the fiduciary relationship, including factors
relating to its formation, the history and duration of the relationship
before an alleged breach occurs, the nature of the beneficiary's reliance
upon the fiduciary, and divergences in the interests of the fiduciary and
beneficiary. It is not always possible, nor is it particularly important, to
61. Sec e.g. Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362-63 (fed. Cir. 2001) (finding a fiduciary
duty owed by department chairman to graduate student, based on the "disparity of their experiences
and roles, and [the department chairman's] responsibility to make patenting decisions regarding [the
student's] inventions").
62. Sec e.g. Intcrc/aim Holdings Ud. v. Ness, Motely, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, 298 1'.
Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (allowing for punitive damages against a law firm that breached its
fiduciary, noting that vulnerability is a factor in whether to allow punitive damages in this type of
case to remain); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, ).,
dissenting) ("The singular vulnerability of the minority in a close corporation has prompted courts
of equity to impose fiduciary obligations on the majority shareholders in their dealings with the
minority and to require 'a high degree of fidelity and good faith."' (quoting Fender v. Prescott, 476
l\:.Y.S.2d 12H, 131-132 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1984))).
63. Sec e.g. Schneider v. Plymouth St. College, 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999) ("'n the context
of sexual harassment by faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary institution and
its students is a fiduciary one. Students are in a vulnerable situation because [ofl 'the power
differential between faculty and students."' (citations ommitted) (quoting Karen Bogart & Nan Stein,
Breaking the Silence; Sexual Harassment in Hducation, 64 Peabody). Educ. 146, 157 ( 1987))).
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clearly demark factors that might affect a court's assessment of a
relationship as opposed to factors relevant to an assessment of the
characteristics of the parties to that relationship. Nevertheless, courts
often consider the relationship and its characteristics as a separate topic
of enquiry, and it is useful to focus upon the relationship between the
parties as well as the respective characteristics of each party.
(a) Formation of the Fiduciary Relationship
• Timing and Length of Relationship: (long-standing or recent;
continuous, intermittent, one time). In general, a higher degree
of duty will attend long standing, continuous fiduciary
relationships in comparison to recent or one-time relationships,
although heightened duties may occur at the outset and at
important intermittent times during a relationship. 64 In the
educational context, we would expect that teacher-student
relationships that extend over many years, such as a research
relationship between a professor and graduate student, or
between a thesis advisor and a PhD candidate, might have an
attendant heightened magnitude of duty. On the other hand, we
would expect a much lower magnitude of duty to exist in a
situation involving a professor of a large introductory course
who is accused of a breach of duty by a student who received a
disappointing grade.
• Degree of Formality in Creation: (formal, informal). In general,
a higher degree of duty will exist in fiduciary relationships, such
as trusts, where there is a high degree of formality in the creation
of the relationship. 6 " In contrast, relationships created merely
through reliance will have a lower degree of duty. Cases
involving breach of fiduciary duty often distinguish between
formal and informal fiduciary relationships, and the magnitude
04. See In rc Sallee, 2811 F.3d R?k (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that debtors with no longstanding
relationship with a bank, and merely a generalized trust in the bank, did not have a fiduciary
relatiomhip with the bank); Lakewood Developments Corp.\'. Schultheis, 2004 WL 76472') at '7 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 6, 2004) (finding that no flduciary duty existed between the parties because "there is no
allegation of the type of long-standing interaction based on mutual trmt necessary to suggest that
any confidential relationship existed").
65. See Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving, 64 !'.3d 227,231 (5th Cir. ILJ'1:i)
("[A[ fiduciary relationship can be created outside of a f(,nnal agreement..
This relationship,
however, 'is an extraordinary one' and will only be established in exceptional cases." (quoting
Stcphanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 1993))); Adomo v. Delgado, 2004 \VI.
234Hl58 at '2 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Oct. 20, 2004) ("A fiduciary relationship may be created either
formally, by contract, or inlclrmally. An infimnal relationship, however, cannot be unilateral, and
occurs only where "both parties understand that a special relationship or trust has been reposed."
(quoting Cull>crtson v. Wigley Title Age my, Inc., 2002 WI. 219570 at' 3 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Feb. 13,
2002) (internal quotation omitted))).
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of duty owed in informal fiduciary relationships tends to be
lower. To the extent that a fiduciary relationship is found to exist
between educators and students, we would expect courts to
evaluate those situations under rubrics applicable to informal
fiduciary relationships, in which case courts would be expected
to focus upon factors such as whether there was an especially
high degree of reliance and trust, an unusual amount of power,
or particular vulnerability on the part of the beneficiary.

• Names, Titles, and Level of Expectations: (lofty, serious,
mundane). A higher degree of duty will exist if names, titles, and
expectations indicate a high degree of seriousness and
responsibility. 60 Although in general we would not expect this
factor to be of tremendous significance in cases involving
teachers, it is more likely that titles might be emphasized in cases
involving school administrators or university professors.
• Nature and Degree of Promises Involved: (solemn, serious,
casual). If a fiduciary agrees to be bound by specific promises and
covenants, it is likely that a higher degree of duty will exist,
especially if those duties are described in ways that indicate a
high degree of duty. We would also expect this factor to be of
relatively little significance in the educational context, although
courts might look to university publications such as course
catalogues or promotional literature for evidence of specific
promises or expectations that might be created.
• Specificity of Powers and Duties of Fiduciary: (core, peripheral;
specific, unspecific). Another characteristic of the fiduciary
relationship that will affect the magnitude of a fiduciary's duty is
the specificity and clarity of the fiduciary's power's and duties.
To the extent that the powers and duties of a fiduciary are
described or understood in detail, or the closer that a matter lies
to the core of a fiduciary's area of responsibility, it will be more
likely that a high degree of duty will be required in connection
with those rights and duties within their enumerated scope. If the
expectations of a fiduciary are clearly defined, it is more likely
that a fiduciary will be held to a strict standard of performance
with respect to those expectations. As a corollary, if a fiduciary's

66. See Shell v. King, 2004 WL 1749186 (Tenn. App. Aug. 5, 2004) (emphasizing the
defendant's position as Chief Manager of an LLC in determining that he violated his fiduciary
obligations); In rc Ahrams, 229 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he managing partner
of a partnership owes to his copartners the highest fiduciary obligations known at law .... "); Moses
v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 964-65 (Pa. Super. 1988) (Cirillo, Pres.)., concurring and dissenting)
(finding that when "the fiduciary relationship between a patient and physician-a relationship built
on the highest expectation of trust--is betrayed," such a breach is "condemned").
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rights and duties are specified in detail, it is less likely that a high
degree of duty will attend events near the periphery or beyond
the scope of the fiduciary's specific powers and responsibilities. 67
On the other hand, if the rights and duties of a fiduciary are
vague or subject to minimal elucidation, as a general matter it is
likely that a lower magnitude of duty will exist, but it is also
possible that such a fiduciary may be held to have violated a duty
that he did not even fully appreciate or understand, since the
distinction between core and peripheral responsibilities and the
boundary between what is and is not required of such a fiduciary
is not clearly defined. With respect to teachers and educators, if a
particular duty lies clearly near the core of the teacher's sphere of
responsibility, or if a duty is specific and well-defined, we would
expect the degree of duty to be higher than for duties that lie on
the periphery of the teacher's responsibility or that are illdefined.

• Attempts to Contractually Alter Fiduciary Duties: (contractual
magnification, silence, contractual diminution; joint, unilateral).
Fiduciaries and beneficiaries sometimes enter into contractual
agreements that seek to alter the baseline duties that a fiduciary
of a certain type normally owes. For example, under the
corporate laws of many states, shareholders are able to pass an
amendment to the corporation's charter or articles of
incorporation that limit director liability for breaches of certain
categories of fiduciary duty. 6 H Similarly, many state statutes
governing limited liability companies allow members to define
down the degree of care and loyalty that managers owe members
and that members owe each other. Thus, the magnitude of duty
will often be lower in situations where parties have explicitly
agreed contractually to limit fiduciary duties. On the other hand,
parties might also increase baseline duties by contractual
agreement, or define those baseline duties in such a way that
magnifies them. It is less likely that attempts to limit fiduciary
duty will be successful if the duties in question are not reciprocal,
or if the party seeking to limit his duties has unequal bargaining
leverage or sophistication."9 It would seem unlikely that teachers
67. Sec Richard A. Berjian, D.O., Inc. v. Ohio Bell Tel., Co., 375 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ohio 197R)
(holding that an exculpatory clause in a telephone company contract, which limited the company's
liability ftlr negligent failure to correctly display advertising in the classified section oi its directory,
was not void because absent any willful or wanton misconduct, the telephone company was entitled
to contractually limit its liability for such a service).
6R. See e.g. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
6'1. See Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 19RY); Appletrec Square I v.
lnvestmark, Inc. 494 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. 1993); Crosby v. Beam, 54X N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 19R9); Hayes
v. Northern Hills Gen. Hasp., 628 N.W.2d 739, 747 (S.D. 2001) ("Courts have generally held that
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or educational institutions would enjoy a high degree of success
if they were to attempt to limit or disclaim their fiduciary duties
since there are such significant asymmetries in power between
universities and would-be students in setting the terms and
conditions of their relationship. But in certain circumstances
courts could be expected to look to university handbooks and
procedures, for example, for guidance about the nature and
magnitude of duties.
• Character of Negotiations and Bargaining Power: (active
negotiation, moderate, medium, minimal, non-existent; equal
bargaining power, unequal bargaining power). In certain
circumstances, courts are suspicious of contractual efforts to
modify fiduciary duties, especially efforts to diminish duties in
situations where there is no real negotiation between the parties,
or if one party appears to be engaged in self-dealing. Thus, for
example, a fiduciary who attempts to limit responsibility through
adhesion contracts may not be successfuJ.711 On the other hand, if
an effort to modify or limit the scope of fiduciary duties is the
result of genuine negotiation between parties of roughly
equivalent bargaining power and sophistication, then it is more
likely that such efforts will be respected. 71 We would expect that
efforts by educators and educational institutions, particularly in
the public sector, to limit or modify their duties will be of limited
success, since there is no real opportunity for bargaining and
negotiations. In contrast, in the private school setting, and in the
context of higher education, efforts to define and limit fiduciary
duties through contract might enjoy a higher degree of success.

where there is a contractual agreement limiting the scope of the fiduciary duty, and where self
dealing is evident, such agreements are invalid." (citing Wartzski v. Redji>rd, 926 i'.2d 11 (I st Cir.
1991)));
70. See Lafrenz v. Lake County Fair Rd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1nd. App. 1977) (finding that
part of the criteria for determining whether contractual exculpation provisions are invalid as
affecting public interest includes whether, "[i[n exercising a superior bargaining power the party
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, <lnd makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence."
(citations omitted)).
71. Sec McTighe v. New Fngland Telephone and Telegraph Co., 216 F.2d 26,28 (2d Cir. 1954)
(holding that contractual limitations of a telephone company's liability for correct advertising was
valid. finding that "[i[f there be some disparity in the bargaining power of the contracting parties it is
no more than may be tiJund generally to exist"); LaFrenz, 360 N.E.2d at 608 (Ind. App. 1977)
("[WI here one party is at such an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the e!Tect of the
contract is to put him at the mercy of the other's negligence. the contract is void as against public
policy.").
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(b) History and Duration of Relationship before the Alleged Breach

• History: (established, periodic, episodic, occasional, one time).
In general, the magnitude of duty will be greater in established
relationships, than in relationships that are episodic, or based
upon a single event or encounter. 72 In the educational context,
we would expect that fiduciaries in long-term, established
relationships will be held to a higher degree of duty than will be
individuals whose encounters with each other are less frequent or
a matter of happenstance.
• Voluntariness of the Association: (mutual choice, unilateral
choice, no choice). In general, duties will be greater, or at least
more clearly defined, in associations in which the fiduciary and
the beneficiary have mutually and voluntarily selected each other
and agreed upon the terms and scope of the relationship. 73 If
choice is unilateral, then a fiduciary might generally be held to a
somewhat higher degree of duty if he has sought out and selected
his beneficiary, whereas the degree of duty might be somewhat
lower if it was the beneficiary who made the unilateral selection.
In contrast, if fiduciaries and beneficiaries find themselves in an
accidental relationship, or if the relationship is thrust upon them,
then the magnitude of duty may be somewhat lower. In the
educational context, if a teacher and student affirmatively and
mutually select each other, as in a research or thesis advisory
relationship, then we would expect the magnitude of duty to be
relatively higher than if the relationship is based upon unilateral
selection, or if it is the result of an assignment that does not
reflect the will or preference of either party.
Exclusivity of the Relationship: (exclusive, primary,
nonexclusive). In general, a higher degree of duty will attend
relationships that are exclusive in nature. 74 Similarly, if a
particular fiduciary relationship represents the fiduciary's
primary occupation, a relatively high degree of duty is likely to
attend that relationship. On the other hand, if a fiduciary

72. Fleming v. Tex. Coastal Bank of Pasadena, 67 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App. 14th Dist. 2002)
(holding that a bank and bank president had no fiduciary duty to disclose another customer's
account information to a new customer, because the new customer had no long-term relationship
with the bank or bank president which may have created an atmosphere of trust).
73. See VNA Plus, Inc. v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1264 (D. Kan.
1998) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty in part because the defendant "knowingly and voluntarily
undertook fiduciary duties" to the plaintiff).
74. See Boilermakers Local No. 374 v. Nat. Lab. Rei. Bd., 852 F.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. C:ir. !988)
(holding that a union's exclusive hiring hall arrangement is held to a high standard of fair dealing
and fiduciary duty because of its potential for coerciveness and exclusiveness).
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represents multiple beneficiaries, we would expect that this
would sometimes result in a somewhat lower magnitude of duty.
For example, a manager for an artist or athlete who works
exclusively for that individual is likely to be held to a relatively
higher magnitude of duty than an agent who represents multiple
artists or athletes. Further down the continuum, a real estate
agent representing numerous home buyers and sellers, or a travel
agent who acts on behalf of numerous clients whom the agent
may not even know, will be held to relatively lower degrees of
duty. We would expect that teachers who have exclusive, or even
primary, responsibility for a student will be held to a higher
magnitude of duty with respect to that student than would a
teacher who does not have such a degree of responsibility.
Similarly, if a teacher has responsibility for a relatively small
number of students, we would expect the degree of duty to be
quite high. On the other hand, if a teacher interacts with
hundreds or thousands of students at a time, the magnitude of
duty towards each student may be quite low, although the duty
to the students as a group may be higher.
• Reciprocity: (reciprocal, unilateral). Another factor that may
affect the magnitude of duty in a fiduciary relationship is
whether the duties owed are unilateral or reciprocal, and whether
each party owes the same types of duty to the other. The
implications of this consideration, however, do not always run in
the same direction. In some circumstances, courts find a higher
degree of duty to exist based upon the fact that duties are
reciprocal. In a partnership, for example, where duties among
partners are mutual, a relatively high degree of duty exists, and
courts sometimes cite the reciprocity of duties as a factor in their
analysis. ~ On the other hand, when a fiduciary has a great
advantage over a beneficiary in power, experience, control, and
expertise, duties that are unilateral may be magnified not only
based upon these factors, but also based upon the fact of the duty
being unilateral. For example, unilateral duties to those who are
particularly vulnerable will often be very high. Thus, in different
types of situations the fact that duties are reciprocal as well as the
f~lct that duties are unilateral may be cited as factors that magnify
a fiduciary's duty. In the educational context, we would also
expect that whether duties are reciprocal or unilateral may enter
7

75. Sec Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d S52, 859 (Colo. 1987) ("Partners in a business enterprise
owe to one another the highest duty of loyalty; they stand in a relationship of trust and confidence to
each other and are bound by standards of good conduct and square dealing."); Couri v. Couri, 447
".E.2d 334,337 (ill. 19H3); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1929) ("Joint adventurers,
like copMtners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the tines! loyalty.").
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into a court's analysis of the magnitude of duty. For example, in a
situation involving duties among professors or colleagues, the
mutuality of duties might be cited as a factor. On the other hand,
in a situation involving the relationship between a teacher and
student, the unilateral character of the duties may be cited
among other factors such as age and vulnerability of the student
beneficiaries as a basis for magnifying the duty owed.
• Relative Power, Sophistication, Information, Control: (fiduciary
superior, equal, beneficiary superior). The degree of duty will
also vary based upon the relative power, sophistication,
information, and control of the parties. 76 It is not surprising that
a fiduciary with a relative advantage will be held to a higher
degree of duty. But it is also sometimes the case that when the
beneficiary of a fiduciary's duty is comparatively powerful,
sophisticated, and informed, the degree of duty in his favor will
be lower. 77 We would expect such considerations to often be
quite important in the educational context. Because professional
educators will often be viewed as having relative advantages over
students in these respects, this may provide a basis for
heightened fiduciary duties. In cases involving children in
elementary or secondary school, differentials in power,
sophistication, information and control will be particularly acute.
But we would also expect this to be considered as a factor in cases
involving university professors and administrators as well.

(c) Reliance
The scope and nature of a beneficiary's reliance upon a fiduciary is

76. Sec e.g. Zurich Capital Markets Inc. v. Coglianese, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1121 (N.D. Ill.
2004) ("'[T]hc touchstone of a fiduciary relationship is the presence of a significant degree of
dominance and superiority of one party over another."' (quoting Lagen v. Bah·or Co, 653 N.E.2d 96R
(Ill App. 2d Dist. 1995))); In re Estate of Rothenberg, 530 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988)
("The bctors which may be considered in determining whether a fiduciary relation exists are the
degree of kinship, disparity in age, health, mental condition, education and business experience
between the parties and the extent to which the allegedly servient party entrusted the handling of his
business and financial affairs to the dominant party and reposed faith and confidence in him. Two
things must appear: that one party was, in fact, 'servient' and the other party 'dominant."')
77. Sec e.g. Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (S.D. Cal.
1993) (precluding liability for breach of fiduciary duty because, "[b ]y selecting the corporate form as
a manner of achieving their goals, Miles and Scripps, both sophisticated parties, elected the benefits
granted under that form and rejected the ... benefits of continuing with a joint venture." (emphasis
added)); A han v. Gram mas, 2004 WL 2724111 at '13 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 2004) (finding no
"evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude, or even infer, that there was a breach of any
tlduciary duty" to plaintiff because, although not an attorney, plaintiff was "a sophisticated
businessman" and "[t]he level of notice for consent theref(ne is not required to be as explicit as it
would be for someone with lesser or no experience").
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another aspect of their relationship that will affect the magnitude of duty
owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary. Several different aspects or
dimensions of reliance may be significant.

• Degree of Reliance by Beneficiary: (high, medium, low). Most
obviously, the extent to which a beneficiary relies upon a
fiduciary to serve and protect her interests will affect the
magnitude of duty owed by the fiduciary. In general, the greater
the degree of the beneficiary's reliance upon the fiduciary, the
greater the degree of duty to which the fiduciary will be held. 7 x
On the other hand, if the beneficiary is not particularly
dependent upon the fiduciary, the magnitude of duty may be
somewhat lower. We would expect this consideration to apply in
the expected manner in cases involving educators, and that it will
often be quite a significant factor. Students often have quite a
high degree of reliance upon teachers, educators, and educational
institutions, and we would expect the degree of duty to be
proportionally high. However, we would not expect that the
mere fact that a student, especially an older student, places trust
in a teacher or educational institution will necessarily result in a
high magnitude of duty? 9
Cause of Reliance: (induced by fiduciary, mutually agreed
upon, implied by fiduciary, inferred by beneficiary, projected by
beneficiary). The cause of the beneficiary's reliance may also
affect the degree of duty owed by the fiduciary.Ho In general, duty
will be higher if the fiduciary is responsible for the fact that a
beneficiary feels a high degree of reliance. For example, if the
fiduciary issues promises or assurances to the beneficiary that the
fiduciary is looking out for and protecting the beneficiary's
interests, then a relatively high magnitude of duty is likely to
exist. This factor is most likely to be of significance in situations
78. See U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) ("'[A]t the heart of the fiduciary
relationship' lies 'reliance, and de facto control and dominance.' The relation 'exists when confidence
is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other."' (citations
omitted)).
79. See Zumbrun v. U. ofS. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1972) C'The mere
placing of trust in another person does not create a fiduciary relationship. An agreement to
communicate one's knowledge, exercising his special knowledge and skill in the are of learning
concerned, does not create a trust but only a contractual obligation."); Ho v. U. o( Tex. at Arlington,
984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998) (finding no fiduciary relationship between a doctoral
student and the university faculty advising and teaching that student); Abrams v. Mary Washington
College., 1994 WL 1031166 at '4 (Va. Cir. Apr. 27, 1994) (holding that there is no common law
"special trust relationship" between college officials and all students).
80. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 1'.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'fa person solicits another to
trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other
is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is
established.").
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where the affirmative assurances by a fiduciary are coupled with
underhanded or secretive activities by that tlduciary that serve
the interests of the tlduciary at the expense of the beneficiary, or
that create a conflict of interest between the parties. On the other
hand, if the reasons for reliance are merely implied by the
tlduciary, or if the reasons for reliance arc inferred by the
beneficiary, then the degree of duty will move progressively
towards the lower end of the spectrum. If reliance is based largely
or entirely upon the projection of duty by a beneficiary upon a
would-be tlduciary, this will likely result in an even lower
magnitude of duty. We would expect this factor to apply in the
educational context in the anticipated manner. If teachers or
other professional educators have said or done specific things to
encourage reliance, for example by giving assurances and
asserting trustworthiness, this might have the effect of increasing
the degree of duty, especially if the fiduciary is acting in a selfserving manner.Ht On the other hand, if an older and relatively
experienced student simply feels that his professors should have
a responsibility to protect and defend his interests as he perceives
them, this would be unlikely to result in a high magnitude of
duty.x 2

Awareness of Beneficiaries' Reliance: (high, medium, low,
nonexistant). A fiduciary in general will be held to a higher
degree of duty if she is aware that the beneficiary is relying upon
her, especially if she understands that the beneficiary's degree of
reliance is high. 81 Increased knowledge always increases one's

ill. See Chou v. U. of Chi., 254 !'.3d 1317, 1363 (i'ed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a graduate
student suftkiently stated a breach of fiduciary duty claim against her department d1erirman who
"specifically represented to her that he would protect and give her proper credit l(>r her research and
inventions," and then who then named himself as the inventor of her discoveries).
82. See 1-io v. U. of Tex. at Arlillgton, 9S4 S.W.2d (172 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 19'!~) (finding,'" a
matter of law, that "formal tlduciary relationships do not exist between teachers .rnd student> in a
normal education setting," and that no infi>rmal fiduciary relationship existed which would impose
upon the university a duty to disclose inti>rmation to stop the doctor,rJ student from se,·king a
doctoral degree when the student was later dismissed from the doctoral program l(>r acackmic
reasons); Mews v. Corp. of' Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106, IOX-09 (Wash. App. Di\' ..1 IYSO) (tinding that
a law school did not have a fiduciary duty to inform the student of the possibility of bilurc became it
is unreasonable to require the university to warn applicants of the obvious).

83. Sec Indus. Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia l'aciji'c, 44 l'..ld 40, ·14 (1st Cir. 1995) c·In determining
whether such a transt(>rmation [from a business relationship into a fiduciary relationship] has t.1ken
place, courts look to the defendant's knowledge of the plaintilrs reliance and considcT the rclarion of
the parties, the plaintiffs business capacity contrasted with that of the dc!Cndant, an,J tire 'rvadines<
of the plaintitl to follow the defendant's guidance in complicated tramactions wherein the defendant
has specialized knowledge."' (quoting Broomfield v. Kosow, 212 N.F.2d 556, 560 (\1a-". 1'!65)));
Bonson v. Diocese of Altoona· Johnstown, 67 Pa. D. & C: 4th ·119, 4.1.1 (Pa. Com. Pleas Ct. .\1ar II,
2004) (upholding a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against a Catholic Bishop who s,·xu,>lh
molested an altar boy and the parish in part because the clergymen "repeatedly imtilled 111 eac·h of its
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level of accountability in law, ethics, or the common sense of
fairness. Thus, if professional educators are aware, or should be
aware, that a student has an unusually high degree of reliance, we
would expect that this might have the effect of elevating the
degree of duty.
(d) Divergence of Interests of Fiduciary and Beneficiaries
• Degree of Alignment of Interests: (conflict of interest; low
alignment; medium, high, identical interests). If the fiduciary's
interests depart significantly from the interests of the beneficiary,
the fiduciary will likely be held to a higher degree of duty, given
the heightened risk that the fiduciary might serve his own rather
than the beneficiary's interest.H 4 Special rules imposing
heightened duties exist in numerous contexts regarding conflicts
of interest, corporate opportunities, and self-dealing, which are
aimed to address problems that arise when interests of a
fiduciary and beneficiary diverge. On the other hand, if the
interests of the fiduciary and the beneficiary are closely aligned, it
is more likely that a court will not feel a need to impose a high
degree of duty, since a court may feel confident in presuming
that the fiduciary will be motivated by self interest to exhibit the
requisite degree of care and loyalty.H 5 As an example, there is not
a developed body of law about the fiduciary duties of airplane
pilots towards their passengers, even though indicia such as
reliance and relative expertise might lead one to believe that this
ought to be a paradigmatic fiduciary relationship. But because
the pilot's and passengers' interests are so closely aligned, we do
not typically think of this relationship under the fiduciary rubric.
In the educational context, we would expect teachers and
parishioners, including the plaintiff~ the belief that priests are figures of authority who should be
relied upon to protect the well being of children in the parishes").
84. See In reMarriage of Egedi, 88 Cal. App. 4th 17, 23 (2d Dist. 2001) ("[C]ounsel 'who
undertake to represent parties with divergent interests owe the highest duty to each to make a full
disclosure of all facts and circumstances which are necessary to enable the parties to make a fully
informed decision regarding the subject matter of the litigation. including the areas of potential
conflict and the possibility and desirability of seeking independent legal advice."' (quoting Klemm v.
Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (App. 5th Dist. 1977))); Bd. of Managers v. Fairway at N. Hills, 193
A.D.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1993) ("[A] condominium's tlrst board of managers is
subject to 'a great potential for conflicts of interest,' such that 'a very high standard of duty' must be
imposed upon it to ensure that its members do not gear their decisions to benefit the sponsor at the
expense of the association or its members." (citation omitted)).
85. Sec Oft: Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Investcorp S.A., 137 F Supp. 2d
502, 507-512 (S.D.N .Y. 200 I) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty to non-management directors by
management directors or holders of preferred stock because "[a]ll the evidence demonstrates that the
interests oi the shareholder defendants were aligned with, and not in contlict wilh, the interests of all
the other shareholders").
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administrators to be held to a heightened duty in situations
where there is a conflict, or potential cont1ict, between their
interests and the interests of students. For example, these duties
would be particularly elevated when a teacher or professor stands
to benefit by taking credit for work properly attributable to a
student. On the other hand, in situations where a fiduciary does
not stand to gain from an outcome that is disappointing to a
student, such as a student who has received a failing grade, it is
much less likely that a court will find a heightened duty.

3.

Characteristics of the Subject Matter

In addition to the characteristics of the parties, and the
characteristics of their relationship, the characteristics of the subject
matter in question is also relevant to an assessment of the degree of duty
to which courts will hold a fiduciary. Four related characteristics of the
subject matter are often taken into account by courts: the significance of
the event in question; the value and magnitude of the entrustment; the
uniqueness of the entrustment; and the public visibility and importance
of the case. In general, the greater the significance of the subject matter at
stake, the more likely it is that a fiduciary will be held to have a high
degree of duty.
(a) Significance of the Event in Question

• Degree of Significance and Importance: (high, medium, low;
absolute terms, relative terms). If the subject matter of a fiduciary
relationship has a high degree of significance, a high degree of
duty will be expected.x 6 On the other hand if the subject matter is
only of little or incidental significance, the magnitude of duty
will likely be lower. For example, a lawyer whose client faces
potential capital punishment should be held to a higher standard
of competence and performance than a lawyer who defends
someone accused of committing a misdemeanor. x; A fiduciary
86. For example, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 104 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). the significance of the
subject matter had been greatly enhanced by the construction of c;rand Central Station in the
neighborhood. This is not mentioned in the case, although the location is given. hut commentators
often point out that the high degree of duty in that case may have been in part due to the richness of
the corporate opportunity at issue.
87. Sec Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 f.3d 915,919 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating defendant's death
sentence afier finding en bane that defendant's counsel at the penalty phase was deficient and that
defendant suffered prejudice and as a result); Anderson v. Calderon, 276 F.3d 483, 484-85 (9th Cir.
2001) (Reinhart,)., dissenting)("! cannot join my colleagues in their decision to permit the state to
proceed with the execution of an individual whose death sentence may well have been imposed, not
because of the crime he committed, but because of the incompetence of an attorney with little
integrity and a pattern of ine!Tective performance in capital cases... If the courts appoint
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might be held to a relatively high magnitude of duty even with
respect to a matter that might appear to be of modest
significance if it is of real significance to the particular
beneficiary. For example, oxygen might appear to be relatively
insignificant, unless someone is being denied access to it. Thus,
the quantum of duty that attended the loss of a specific dollar
amount of money might lie upon a sliding scale depending upon
whether the beneficiary was very wealthy at one end of the
spectrum as opposed to destitute at the other end of the
spectrum.
(b) Corpus: Value and Magnitude of Entrustment
Sometimes a fiduciary is obliged to take care of a particular
entrustment and to manage or invest that entrustment in the interests of
specified beneficiaries. For example, a trustee will have responsibility to
invest the funds in a trust according to standards of prudence,
diversification, etc. The magnitude of duty that will be imposed upon
such a fiduciary will often vary based upon the value and magnitude of
the entrustment. There are several factors that contribute to an
assessment of the value of a corpus of entrustment.
Tangible Amount Involved: (large, medium, small,
nonexistent). Most obviously, the tangible amount of an
entrustment will affect the magnitude of duty that will attend the
entrustment. If the financial value of the entrustment is large, it
is more likely that a high degree of duty will exist, whereas if the
financial value of the entrustment is small, the corresponding
duty is likely to be of a lower magnitude. For example, trustees of
large pension or retirement funds are subject to higher
magnitude duties compared with the expectations of a family
member who is assigned to invest funds in a small family trust.
Intangible Values Involved: (large, medium, small,
nonexistent). In addition to tangible value, a variety of factors
may influence the intangible value of an entrustment. High
magnitude intangible values may result in a heightened degree of
duty. HH

incompetent counsel to handle a capital case, we should not then compound that judicial error by
permitting the state to execute the ill-represented defendant."); johnson v. State, 1992 WL 158313 at
"1 (Tenn. <:rim. App. july 9, 1992) (holding that defendant did not have incompetent counsel in his
representation for three misdemeanor charges).
88. See In re Mullen, 200 B.R. 352, 357 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) ("When a party uses a
business's goodwill to its own advantage, the party has breached a fiduciary duty owed to the
business, and the party in interest and the business may recover [the value of this intangible asset]."
(citing Baker v. Pratt, 176 Cal. App. 3d 370, 380-81 (2d Dis!. 1986))).
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For the most part fiduciaries in the educational context are not
responsible for investing or managing funds. An exception is the
management of universities' endowment and retirement funds, and we
would expect the fiduciary standards that would apply in the educational
setting would not vary significantly from the standards that apply to such
situations in general.
(c) Uniqueness of Entrustment
• Type of Property Involved: (irreplaceable, unique, commodity,

fungible). If the corpus of a fiduciary entrustment is unique or
irreplaceable, a high degree of duty will attend that entrustment.
Irreplaceable items such as antiquities, fine art and old
documents of historic importance will carry high magnitude
duties. In contrast, if the entrustment is in no way unique or
irreplaceable, it is likely that a relatively lower degree of duty will
exist. 89 In the educational setting, we would expect that the
highest duties will attach to human beings, since bricks and
mortar can be replaced.
(d) Public Importance
A final set of factors relating to the subject matter of an entrustment
that affects the magnitude of duty is the public importance, profile, or
impact of a case. As the visibility and perceived public importance of a
case increases, it is more likely that a high degree of duty will be imposed.
Public Profile and Visibility: (high, medium, low). One
dimension of public importance is the profile or public visibility
of the case. If public visibility is high, we would expect this to
increase the likelihood that a high degree of duty will be found. If
on the other hand, public visibility is low a court may
subconsciously, if not consciously, apply a lower degree of duty.
We would expect this factor to sometimes be significant in the
educational context, especially if a case involves sexual
misconduct of a teacher involving a minor, or other misconduct
of a shocking or self-serving nature. Because education is an
issue that is of tremendous public importance and often in the
public eye, public profile and visibility of a particular case may

89. See Comcast Sound Comrmm., Inc. v. Hoeltke, 174 A.D.2d 1023, 10024 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th
Dept. 1991) (holding that former salesmen did not breach fiduciary duty of loyalty for violation of
noncom petition clauses because there was "no demonstration that defendants performed services of
a unique nature for plaintiff' and "[a]lthough defendants were valuable sales personnel, they were
not irreplaccabk nor did their leaving plaintiffs employ cause plaintiff special harm").
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have the effect of magnifying the degree of duty that a court finds
in a case.
• Public Concern or Attention: (high, medium, low). Another
dimension of public importance is the degree of public concern
about an issue. Even if a case does not have a high degree of
visibility, there may be a high degree of public concern or
attention. We would expect this t~1ctor to also sometimes result
in the magnification of duties in the educational context. For
example, in the area of public education, often the attention of a
vocal group of concerned parents can raise the stakes with
respect to the magnitude of duty that will be applied to a case.
Public Image and Reputation of Parties: (strongly positive,
positive, neutral, negative, strongly negative; absolute, relative).
A related, but distinct, element of public importance involves the
public image and reputation of the parties, both the fiduciary and
the beneficiary. If a fiduciary has a shady or questionable
reputation, it may be that he is held to a higher degree of duty,
based upon skepticism about his character or motives. On the
other hand, a person with a good reputation for character and
integrity may be more likely given the benefit of the doubt with
respect to an alleged breach of duty, with the effect of holding
that person to a lower degree of duty. This factor, however, docs
not always apply in such a simple or straightforward manner. At
times the high public reputation of a fiduciary may be cited as a
factor in holding that fiduciary to a particularly high standard of
behavior. The public reputation of the beneficiary can also affect
the magnitude of duty attributed to the fiduciary, with a good
reputation enhancing duty and a bad reputation diminishing
duty.
We would expect that in the educational setting, because of
their generally positive reputations, teachers and educators may
often be given the benefit of the doubt with respect to issues and
decisions that lie squarely within their areas of expertise and
competence, such as grading students and setting standards for
receiving or tailing to receive a degree. This might result in the
perception and perhaps the reality of a relatively low magnitude
of duty in these areas. On the other hand, when alleged
misbehavior lies further from the core elements of the
educational mission, we would expect it to be less likely that
teachers would be afforded such leeway. Indeed, the fact that
teachers have a reputation for trustworthiness might be
considered a factor that enhances duty. For example, in cases
involving alleged sexual misconduct or self-dealing, we would
expect the high public reputation of educators to be a factor in
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enhancing the degree of duty they owe students and other
beneficiaries. The reputation of the beneficiary might also be a
factor in the educational context. If a beneficiary appears to be an
innocent victim, this may result in an enhanced degree of duty,
whereas if the beneficiary himself appears to be engaged in selfdealing or self-deceptive behavior, this may result in a lowered
standard of duty being applied to the fiduciary.

4.

Source of Legal Action

A fourth category of considerations that affects the magnitude of
duty is the source of legal action under which an alleged breach of duty is
asserted. Legal claims alleging a breach of fiduciary duty arise under a
large number of legal bases, including federal statutes, such as ERISA,
state statutes, such as corporate codes, and under the common law,
where fiduciary relationships are a long-standing feature of equity.
In general, actions under federal statutes will have higher degrees of
duty compared with actions brought under state statutes, and actions
brought pursuant to statutory enactment will carry higher degrees of
duty than actions brought under the common law. This is of course an
oversimplification, but as a general guidepost it is nevertheless somewhat
helpful in assessing the likelihood that a fiduciary will be held to a
relatively high or low degree of duty.
We would expect that in the educational context the degree of duty
imposed on fiduciaries will vary based upon the underlying legal source
of the claim. The most likely underlying legal claim will be based upon
the common law standards applicable to fiduciaries, which often result in
relatively low magnitudes of duty.

B.

Quantifying the Magnitude of an Alleged Breach of Duty

Thus far, our analysis has identified a range of factors-including the
characteristics of the fiduciary, the characteristics of the beneficiary, the
characteristics of the subject matter, and the source of the legal actionthat affect the magnitude of duty that will exist in a particular case or
situation.
The second step in analyzing the magnitude of fiduciary duties and
their breaches assesses the performance of the fiduciary, and seeks to
measure to extent to which the fiduciary has either exceeded or fallen
short in the expected standard of performance of her duties. Just as the
magnitude of duty varies based upon a variety of factors, the magnitude
of an alleged breach also varies. As one might expect, there are a variety
of factors relevant to an assessment of a fiduciary's performance. Also as
might be expected, when a high magnitude duty exists, a higher standard
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of performance will be required in order to satisfy or meet that duty. On
the other hand, if the magnitude of duty in a particular situation is
relatively low, then the expectations of the fiduciary will be lower and the
degree of performance required in order to satisfy that duty will be more
modest. While a particular standard of performance may be sufficient to
clear the bar in the case of a relatively low level duty, the same standard
of performance may be insufficient in the case of relatively high
magnitude duty.
In assessing a fiduciary's performance, there are four general
categories of considerations that courts take into account: (i) the
character of the harm suffered; (ii) the character of the fiduciary's
deliberative process; (iii) the character of the fiduciary's motives; and (iv)
the classification of the alleged breach of duty.

I.

Character and Extent of the Harm Suffered

The first factor courts consider in quantifying the magnitude of an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty is the character of the harm suffered.
Courts are likely to view high magnitude losses as evidence of a high
magnitude breach of duty and of a low level of performance by the
fiduciary. In contrast, small magnitude losses are likely to be considered
evidence of only small magnitude breaches, or even no breach of duty. If
the harm suffered by the beneficiary is relatively small, then even a
degree of performance by a fiduciary that might be somewhat deficient
may not result in liability. On the other hand, if the harm suffered is of a
high magnitude, then a similar standard of performance by a fiduciary
might result in liability. In assessing the character and extent of harm
suffered, courts focus on several different dimensions of harm, including
the magnitude of loss or harm, the breadth of loss or harm, and the
frequency of the loss or harm.
a.

Magnitude of the Loss or Harm

Loss of Life: (numerous, several, one). At one end of the
spectrum of magnitude of loss or harm is loss of life. If many
lives are lost, courts may view the degree of breach as being
especially high. When such a high magnitude loss occurs, courts
will often find liability even if the degree of duty owed was quite
modest. 00 This is because a very low degree of performance (i.e., a

90. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns o(Amcrica, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Ariz. 19'10) (holding
a hotel liable l(rr 1;1iling to warn independent contractor security guard of a robbery on the premises
when the robber returned and shot and killed the security guard); Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Andcrson
"Fravel, Inc., 890 P.2d 6'1 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1994) (holding travel agency liable for breaching duty to
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very high magnitude breach of duty) will not be sufficient to
clear even a relatively low level duty. We would expect that in the
educational context, when students die as a result of the
negligence or failures of oversight of teachers or administrators,
there is a relatively high likelihood that a court might find a
breach of duty. If the loss of life is due to affirmative malfeasance
on the part of a teacher or other fiduciary, this will be viewed as
an even higher magnitude breach, and the likelihood of liability
will be even greater. If the risk of loss was foreseeable or could
have easily been avoided, then this factor will likewise amplify
the magnitude of breach and make liability for a breach of duty
more likely.

• Physical or Emotional Injury: (large, medium, small). The
magnitude of loss will also be very high in the event of serious
physical or emotional injury.Y 1 Physical and emotional injuries
can occur along a spectrum of seriousness, and the greater the
quantum of injury suffered by a beneficiary or beneficiaries, the
more likely a fiduciary will be held to have violated a duty. On
the other hand, if the degree of injury is relatively small, it
becomes decreasingly likely that a court will consider there to
have been a high magnitude breach of duty. We would expect
that the magnitude of physical or emotional injury suffered by
students could be an important factor in assessing the magnitude
of breach of duty in the educational context. For example, a
teacher involved in sexual misconduct with students, especially
young students, will likely be liable. 92 Some especially high
magnitude breaches of duty, including sexual relations with a
minor, are proscribed by criminal law. As a result, the equitable
warn of known dangers in selling its tour when student traveler wa.s killed during train ride to
,'v1exico); lluncavagc v. Allen, ·197 N.F.2d 433 (Ill. App. 1st J)ist. ll)H6) (holding a landlord liable for
breaching his duty to maintain the safety of the premise.s when a woman was rc1ped and murdered in
the residence by an intruder).
91. Sec lla!Jiin v. Evangcliml Child & Fam. Agcn<y, 2S2 F. Supp. 2d 666, 66lJ (1'\.ll. Ill. 20112)
(finding plaintitls claim {(Jr injuries to their l:1mily and emotional distress overcame a motion to
disrni" by dekndant adoption agency which failed to disclose full information about the adopted
child who later exhibited major emotional problems); Markowitz v. Arizona /'arks /3d., 706 P.2d 367,
371 (Ariz. l'JH5) (holding a state has a duty to take reasonable precaution tn avoid injury to invitees
in recreational area when boy was seriously injured a tier diving into shallow water); Doc v. Roc, 6H 1
N.E.2d 640, 045~46 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (permitting plaintiff to pursue damages for mental
distress when her attorney breached his fiduciary duty by using his position as altorncv and his
knowledge of client's dependence upon him to gain sexual favors).

92. Sec e.g. State v. Oddi, 2002 Ohio 5926 (Ohio App. 5th D1st. 2002) (upholding the gmss
sexual imposition conviction of a driver's education teacher who fondled studenh who were minors
(cited in ,\'tate v. Clay, 2005 WL 17S85 at '3 (Ohio App.'Jth Dist. jan. 5, 2005))); State v. liairJcv, 2003
vVL 213029l)3 (Tenn. Crim. App. june 6, 2003) (upholding the conviction of a principal, who also
served as the girl's basketball coach, on seven counts of sexual battery by an ,lllthority Cigure and
eleven counts of statutory rape t(lr his sexual relationship with a tenth grade student).
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principles used in assessing an alleged violation of fiduciary duty
may not be directly implicated, but if a claim were mounted
under the rubric of fiduciary duty (such as in a civil suit against
the teacher or school district), the high magnitude injury would
often be an important consideration in the decision to hold a
teacher or other fiduciary liable. 93
• Loss of Wealth: (large, medium, small, de minimis). In general,
monetary loss will exist somewhat further down the continuum
of loss. As might be expected, however, the amount of money
lost will be directly relevant to an assessment of the magnitude of
loss. If fiduciary conduct results in a significant loss of wealth, it
is more likely that a court will find a high magnitude breach of
duty, whereas small losses are more likely to trigger a finding of
low-degree breaches of duty, or even a finding that there has
been no breach of duty. 94 If monetary stewardship lies at the
center of a fiduciary's responsibilities, then monetary loss is more
likely to be deemed a high-degree breach of duty. But if
monetary loss is modest, or de minimis, even seemingly
egregious failures by a fiduciary may not result in liability,
especially if such failures are matters of carelessness rather than
self-dealing. 95 Given the nature of the fiduciary entrustment of
teachers, we would not expect monetary loss to be a common
feature of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. We would expect,
however, that issues involving assertions of financial impropriety
might be more common in the case of administrators with
responsibility over significant budgets. In such cases, we would
expect the magnitude of monetary loss to be relevant to a
determination of whether there has been a breach of fiduciary
duty, perhaps not so much as a matter of principle as a matter of
expediency.

93. Doc v. City of New Orleans, 577 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
school board could be found liable for the sexual molestation of a nine-year-old student in a school
restroom during school hours by an unknown man, even though no liability was imposed on the
teacher who allowed the student to go to the restroom by her;elf, because board had the duty to
promulgate official policy against allowing young children to leave the classroom alone during
school hours).
94. See Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 655
(E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding claim for breach of fiduciary duty of investment banking firm whose
abuse of the fiduciary relationship and misappropriation of confidential business information
resulted in plaintiffs "sutlering significant financial losses").
95. If no loss results from a breach, then no monetary liability exists. See Roth v. SawyerCleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 920 (8th Cir. 1994); Friend v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 35 F.3d 466, 469
(9th C:ir. 1994); Ironworkers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 695 F.2d 531,536 (11th C:ir. 1983) (where loss
existed but did not result from alleged breach).
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Breadth of Loss or Harm

•

Number of People Harmed: (large, medium, small, single
individual). In general, if a large number of people are harmed, it
is more likely that a court will find a high magnitude breach of
duty. Especially in cases involving a small magnitude of harm,
such as relatively small per share stockholder losses, if the loss
affects a large number of people the likelihood of liability is
heightened. In general, if a small number of people suffer harm
as a result of a fiduciary's alleged misconduct, it will be less likely
that a court will find a breach of fiduciary duty. If, however, a
small number of people, or even a single individual, suffers a very
high magnitude of harm, this may be sufficient to trigger liability
and the limited breadth of the harm will not serve to vindicate
the fiduciary. 96 We would expect this general pattern to apply in
the educational context. If large numbers of students are harmed,
then a smaller per-student quantum of harm might be required
before liability is imposed. 97 If a small number of students are
harmed, we would expect that a larger quantum of per-student
harm would be required before a court will find liability.
c.

Frequency of the Harm Suffered

How Often Harm Suffered: (continuous, ongoing, frequent,
periodic, occasional, isolated incident). If the harm suffered is
continuous or ongoing, it is more likely that a court will find a
high magnitude of breach of fiduciary duty than if the harm is
only occasional or limited to an isolated incident.n To be sure, if
harm is of a high magnitude, the fact that it occurred only once
96. See supra, nn. 90-97 and accompanying text for discussion of the magnitude of the loss or
harm.
97. Sec Deitsch v. Tillery, 833 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. 1992) (holding that parents of students at an
elementary school stated a claim of negligence against the school district, school board, and school
employees f(lr negligence which resulted in exposure to asbestos).
<JR. See Riverside Auto Sales, Inc. v. GE Capital Warranty Corp., 2004 WI. 2106638 '7 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 30, 2004) (finding that "[w]hether [defendant] wrongfully removed fees each month may
be <ln issue to consider with respect to Plaintiffs' breach of tlduciary duty or breach of contract
claims"); Apollo Technologies Corp. v. Centrosphere Indus. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157, 1199-1200
(D.\\'.). 1992) (denying preliminary injunctive relief on breach offiduciary duty claim because there
was no longer an ongoing harm to corporation, yet tlnding that the corporation demonstrated the
likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of fiduciary duty claim arising from Centrosphere
continuing to hold itself out as Apollo's agent after the expiration of the agency relationship). Harris
v. Archer, 134 S.W.3d 422, 438 (Tex. App. 7th Dis!. 2004) (finding that although a partner\ breach of
fiduciary duty was "reprehensible" because it was "an intentional action intended to gain a benellt
for himself," the breach was not "particularly egregious" for purposes of determining punitive
damages because it was an isolated incident, the harm was only economic, and the harmed partner
was not in a position of vulnerability).
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or infrequently will not serve as a persuasive basis for forestalling
liability. In general, however, if the harm is frequent or ongoing,
even if the harm is of a relatively low magnitude, the high
frequency will serve as a basis for magnifying the breach of duty.
We would expect this pattern to apply in the usual fashion in the
educational context, with frequent breaches of high magnitude
duties being the most likely to result in liability.
• Duration of Alleged Breach: (longstanding, moderate, brief). A
factor closely related to but distinct from frequency of harm is
the duration of when the harm occurs. In general, breaches of an
extended duration are more likely to be considered a high
magnitude breach of duty than are breaches of short duration.
For example, a trustee that has engaged in a long pattern of
monetary expropriations is more likely to be found liable than a
trustee who can plausibly claim that a single exceptional instance
of misconduct was a mistake or oversight that should not result
in liability. 99 As is the case with frequency, however, the fact of
short duration may not serve as a basis for forestalling liability in
the case of a severe breach. In the educational context, we would
expect that if a pattern of fiduciary misconduct extends over a
long period of time, it is more likely that a court will find a
breach of duty. This factor is most likely to be relevant in
instances of relatively low-level breaches of duty, which come to
be viewed as significant due to their chronic nature.
2.

Character of the Fiduciary's Deliberative Process

A second set of factors that will affect a determination of the
magnitude of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is the nature and
character of the fiduciary's deliberative process. In general, the greater
the defects in a fiduciary or a group of fiduciaries' deliberative process
the greater the likelihood that a court will find a high magnitude breach
of duty, whereas an adequate or, better yet, admirable deliberative
process will make it more likely that even in the event of an unfortunate
outcome a court will find a low magnitude breach, if indeed it finds any
breach at all. If the character and process of deliberation is sufficient,
fiduciaries will be insulated from liability even in thl face of many

99. See Production Resources Group, L.LC. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, S00-01 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (refusing to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim because "the unusual pattern of
conduct is suggestive of injury to NCT as a finn" and "a suspicious pattern of dealing ... raises the
legitimate concern that the NCr board is not pursuing the best interests of NCT's creditors as a
class"); Beacon Hill CBO, Ud. v. Beacon Hill Asset, 314 F Supp. 2d 205,210 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding
that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of tlduciary duty through the assertion that defendant
violated fiduciary duties through a "systematic pattern of mi>eonduct").
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failings in outcome. The character of the deliberative process will be
particularly important in situations involving business decisions or other
discretionary decisions that affect the monetary status of beneficiaries.
For example, courts often scrutinize the deliberative processes of
corporate directors, money managers, and trustees who have investment
discretion over client funds. The deliberative process is likely to be of
heightened importance when decisions are made collectively by a group
of fiduciaries. There are several sub-factors relevant to an assessment of
deliberative process, including the character of deliberations and the
diligence with which they are conducted, the quality and quantity of
information upon which a decision was based, the character and
consistency of fiduciaries' recollections and accounts of a collective
deliberative process, and whether alternatives other than the ultimate
course of action were analyzed and considered.
a.

Character of Deliberations/Diligence

•
Length: (long, medium, short; many occasions, several
occasions, one occasion). In general, lengthy deliberations are
more likely to result in a court finding a low-magnitude breach,
or no breach, of fiduciary duty, even when things turn out badly,
whereas short or perfunctory deliberations may result in a
finding of a breach, possibly even a high magnitude breach, of
duty, even when things arguably turn out well. In general, when
important decisions are at stake, such as a board of directors'
decision to sell a company, longer and multiple deliberations will
be viewed more favorably by courts than shorter or one-time
deliberations. 1110 What constitutes an adequate length of
deliberation varies significantly based upon the nature of the
decision and the environment in which the decision is made. If
there are factors which make urgent action necessary, it is less
likely that a court will fault fiduciaries for not engaging in
lengthy deliberations. If on the other hand, time is not of the
essence in making a decision, or if the sense of emergency is
artificial or manufactured, then it is less likely that the perceived

100. Sec Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. WHX Corp., 967 f. Supp. 59,()() (D. Conn. 1997) (finding no
breach of fiduciary duty in the manner in which the Board reached its decisions because "[e[ach of
the Board's decisions was made deliberately, after extensive discussion and consideration of tbe
advice of its financial and legal advosors and consideration of a range of alternative strategies");
Lewis v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (holding that no fiduciary
duty had been breached because the board spent a considerable amount of time studying and
digesting the plan); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Dei. Super. 1985) (holding that board
breached its fiduciary duty of care because its approval of the sale of the company on two hours
consideration without prior notice did not satisfy its duty to act with informed reasonable
deliberation).
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emergency will be seen as a valid reason for foreclosing or
shortening deliberations. A court's assessment of the adequacy of
deliberations will also be affected by notification and preparation
for deliberating an important matter. For example, if a board of
directors is going to deliberate a proposed sale or merger of their
company, and they have advance notice and detailed information
about a proposed transaction, it is more likely that their
deliberations will be deemed adequate. 101 If on the other hand,
the board hears about a proposed transaction for the first time at
the meeting at which the transaction is ultimately approved, then
it is more likely that a court will find fault with the character of
their deliberations. In the educational context, a court would
likely look to faculty meetings, formulation of school policies,
conferral with colleagues, etc. to determine the length of
deliberations.
• Character: (solemn, serious, casual, flippant; multiple options
considered, several options, single option; high participation,
medium participation, low participation; active questioning,
moderate questioning, low questioning, no questioning; in
person, on phone, absent). The character and seriousness of
deliberations will also be relevant to a determination whether
there has been a high or low magnitude breach of duty.
Deliberations that are active as opposed to passive will be less
likely to result in liability. 1112 Deliberations in which only one
option is considered will be more likely to result in liability than
deliberations in which the respective merits of a variety of
options are debated. 1113 If deliberations are ad hoc or
uninformed, 104 if written materials have not been prepared in
advance, 10 " if the majority of participants are on the phone rather

llll. I"cwis, 664 l\i.F.2d at 135 (finding no breach of fiduciary duty by Board members in part
because "[p[rior to the meeting they received a dc\ailed, thirty-four page memorandum explaining
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed plan").

102. Sec e.g Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 574 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding breach of
fiduciary duty in part because "the evidence shows that tbe remaining directors passively allowed
Walden-the fiduciary having the strongest conflicting interest-to dominate the decision making
proce" with the result that the outcome was favorable to him").
103. Sec e.g J)ux Capital Mgt. v. Chen, 2004 WL 1936309 at '11 (N.D. Cal. Aug 31, 2004)
(finding breach of fiduciary duty in part because defendants failed to duly consider other alternatives
to bankruptcy); Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 573-74 (holding that corporation's board of directors
breached fiduciary duties in part because "the evidence docs not support the contention that the
board seriously considered the alternatives to a repurchase, and to the extent that alternatives were
(in fact) r\liscd, they were quickly brushed aside because [the director with the strongest conflicting
interest] disfanned them").

IIH.

Infra nn. 106-113, and accompanying text.

Sec e.g In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., H25 A.2d at 275, 287 (finding lack of
businc,, judgment where directors neither received nor attempted to review actual draft
1115.
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than present in person, if a large number of participants are
missing, or if memories of deliberations are sketchy and vaguethese sorts of factors increase the likelihood that a court will find
a breach of fiduciary duty.
• Consultations with Experts: (meaningful, pro forma, nonexistent). One way in which fiduciaries can decrease the
likelihood of being found in violation of their fiduciary duties is
by consulting with relevant experts before making a decision. 10"
On the other hand, the failure to consult experts when doing so
would enhance the likelihood of making a good decision can be a
factor in finding a breach of duty. 107 The qualifications and
reputation of the experts, their level of preparation and
thoroughness, and the quality of their written and oral materials
and presentations will also affect the degree of deference that a
court is willing to give to a fiduciary's or group fiduciaries'
deliberations.

b.

Information upon Which an Action was Based

• Quality: (high, medium, low). If important decisions are based
upon information of a high quality, it is less likely that a court
will find a breach of fiduciary duty than if decisions are based
upon information of poor quality. 10 H
• Quantity: (highly informed, somewhat informed, anecdotal, ad
hoc, uninformed; written materials (detailed, somewhat detailed,
not detailed; accurate, somewhat accurate, inaccurate; complete,
mostly complete, incomplete)). Similarly, the sheer quantity of
employment agreements but rather received merely a summary of terms and conditions, and where
there was no further board or committee review of the final agreement which "differed substantially
from the original draft").
106. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261 (Del. Super. 2000) (finding that directors did not
breach their fiduciary duty in creati1.5 a compensation package for the president partially because
they relied on an outside executive search consultant); Lewis, 664 N.E.2d at 134 (finding no breach of
fiduciary duty in part because the Board solicited the advice of its law firm and its broker, and
"[b]oth recommended the plan that the board ultimately adopted").
107. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 288 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that
directors and president breached fiduciary duties in dealing with the president's employment
contract and non-fault termination, emphasizing that "no expert was retained to advise the Old
Board, the committee, or [the CEO]").
108. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10-12 (Del. Super. 1998) (holding that "directors who
knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual
stockholder violate their fiduciary duty"); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1127-28 (Del. C:h.
1999) (finding that "courts inquire as to the type and quality of inf(Jrmation in shareholders' hands
prior to the vote" in determining whether directors have complied with their duty to disclose all
material information, when they are seeking the affirmative vote of shareholders, such that
shareholders are "fully informed").
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information can also make a difference in an assessment of
whether fiduciaries have fulfilled their duties. In general, a
greater amount of information taken into account will decrease
the likelihood of liability. 109
•
Time to Study and Digest: (ample, adequate, minimal,
inadequate). In general, if fiduciaries have had ample time to
study and digest information, especially if it is of a complex and
multifaceted nature, it is less likely that a court will find them to
be in violation of fiduciary duties, including the duties of
diligence and care. 110 On the other hand, if complex or difficult
decisions are made hastily, without adequate time to study and
digest relevant information, it is more likely that a court will find
a breach of duty. 111
• Due Diligence: (thorough, adequate, cursory, nonexistent).
When important discretionary decisions are being made,
fiduciaries are expected to conduct an investigation of a
proposed course of action, often referred to as conducting due
diligence. 112 If a fiduciary fails to conduct adequate due
diligence, it increases the likelihood that a court will find a
breach of fiduciary duty. 113

109. See e.g. Lewis v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 664 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1996) (finding
no breach of fiduciary duty when the evidence clearly demonstrated that "the Board considered
several alternatives in addition to the plan and that it had a substantial amount of outside
information and counsel from both the law firm and the investment banking groups" (internal
quotation omitted)).
110. See Gray v. Zondervan Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-82 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that
directors of target corporation did not breach their fiduciary duties to shareholders because decision
to recommend acceptance of lock-up, topping, and expense fees and employment contracts was
made by a committee of outside directors after substantial deliberation and extensive input from
financial and legal experts).
Ill. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 287-88 (finding breach of fiduciary
duty when compensation committee and Board spent a fraction of an hour deliberating and asked no
questions about the proposed employment contract of the prospective new president).
112. Uss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that defendants' omissions,
including failure to properly investigate investments and failure to exercise due diligence, constituted
a "prototype for breached fiduciary duty").
113. See e.g. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 124 (7th Cir. 1984) (failing to make an intensive and
independent investigation of investment options constitutes breach of fiduciary duty); Keach v. U.S.
Trust Co., N.A., 256 f. Supp. 2d 840,842 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (upholding claim of breach of fiduciary duty
since evidence "could support the reasonable inference that [defendant's] due diligence
investigations failed to rise to the level of prudence necessary to insulate it from liability for breach of
fiduciary duty").
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c. Consistency of Fiduciaries' Memories and Accounts of Decision
Making

• Degree of Consistency and Detail: (high, medium, low;
documented, vaguely documented, undocumented). Fiduciaries
are often required to give an account of the process they engaged
in when making important decisions. If a fiduciary or group of
fiduciaries have a clear, detailed, recollection of the decisionmaking process, and if the relevant accounts are consistent with
each other, it decreases the likelihood that a court will find that
there has been a breach of duty. Documentation to support such
recollections, such as detailed board minutes, or written
materials from presentations about a proposed course of action,
will also decrease the likelihood of liability. On the other hand, if
a fiduciary has very little detailed recollection, or if individual
members of a group of fiduciaries do not remember details, or if
memories are vague or inconsistent, it increases the likelihood
that a court will find a breach of duty. 114
d.

Consideration of Alternatives

• Alternatives Considered: (multiple, several, two, one). When
important discretionary decisions are subject to scrutiny, if a
fiduciary or group of fiduciaries has actively considered a range
of alternative courses of action, as opposed to only one or two
favored options, it increases the likelihood that a court will not
find a breach of duty. 115 On the other hand, if deliberations were
limited to a single possible course of action, or if only one option
was seriously considered, it is more likely that a court will find a
breach of duty. 116
Actions Taken to Foreclose Alternatives: (high prohibitive
effect, medium, low). Sometimes a fiduciary or group of
fiduciaries will take affirmative actions to foreclose alternatives
114. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Utig., H25 A.2d at 2H'J (refusing to grant din•c\ors
protection under the business judgment rule in part because there was no evidence in the hoard
meeting minutes that the directors seriously undertook their duty to consider the terms or the
president's hiring and subsequent termination, giving the impression that the direc\or.s "consciously
and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities" (emphasis removed)).
115. See Lewis v. Playboy Hnterprises. Inc., 664 N.~..2d 13J, 134 (Ill i\pp ht Dist. llJ'.Ih)
(finding no breach of fiduciary duty in part became "!s]enior management considered l()l]r different
restructuring transactions").

116. See Strassburger v. Harley, 752 A.2d at 573-74 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that corporation's
board of directors breached fiduciary duties in part because "the evidence docs not "'ppurt the
contention that the board seriously considered the alternatives to a rcpurcha"'· and to the extent that
alternatives were (in fact) raised, they were quickly brmhcd aside").
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that might be in the best interest of beneficiaries, which will
increase the likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary
duty. For example, if a board of directors that has decided to sell
the company takes actions to foreclose higher potential
competing bids, this will increase the likelihood that a court will
find the board liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. 117
3.

Character of the Fiduciary's Motives

An important third set of factors that courts utilize in assessing the
magnitude of an alleged breach of duty centers around the fiduciary's
motives. In general, questionable or unacceptable motives increase the
likelihood of a court finding a breach of duty, and salutary or
unassailable motives increase the likelihood of a court finding no breach
of duty. Improper motives, such as greed, also exist along a continuum,
and the more unacceptable the motive, the more likely it is that a high
magnitude breach will be found. In addition, and perhaps less intuitively
obvious, inappropriate motives themselves exist along a spectrum, with
greed, self-dealing, disloyalty, and conflicts of interest, for example, being
more problematic than anger, fear, laziness or inattentiveness. Of course,
high magnitude instances of even the less objectionable motives can
result in liability, such as when negligence rises to the level of
recklessness or gross negligence, or when carelessness rises to the level of
abdication. Problematic motives often combine with other defects in the
fiduciary's behavior or performance, in which case courts sometimes
treat them as something like an aggravating factor in increasing the
magnitude of a breach.
a.

Conflicts of Interest

Fiduciaries are expected to act exclusively in the interests and for the
benefit of their beneficiaries. 11 H In Judge Cardozo's memorable

117. See Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 285-86 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that president breached
fiduciary duty of care to corporation under Texas law by failing to diligently market corporation's
assets and seek out potential buyers because, even though president did not preclude other buyers
from making competing offers, he did not take affirmative steps to market the corporation's assets
other than to the company who secretly negotiated with the president).
118. See Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) ('"Perhaps the most fundamental duty of
a trustee is that he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the
interests of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interesb
of third persons."' (quoting (;eorge Gleason Bogart & George Taylor Bogert, The l.aw of Trusts and
Trustees§ 543, 217 (2d ed., West 1984))); Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546 ("Many t(Jrms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary tit,. A trustee is held to s0mething stricter than the morals of the market plan.' .... Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").

formulation fiduciaries owe an "undivided loyalty" and a "punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive." 11 Y Contlicts of interest take many forms and
are condemned under a variety of doctrinal rubrics including the duties
of loyalty and good faith, prohibitions on self-dealing and selfenrichment, and the corporate opportunities doctrine.
• Selfish Motives/Greed: (high, medium, low; dominant motive,
intermediate degree motive, insignificant motive). One of the
ways that a fiduciary will most dramatically increase the
likelihood that a court will find her liable for a breach of
fiduciary duty is to act from selfish motives. 120 Greed is probably
the predominant selfish motive that results in a finding that a
fiduciary has breached her duty. Greed may or may not be good
when an individual is acting in pursuit of her own conception of
her own self-interest, but is almost always an unacceptable
motive in a fiduciary. An exception exists in cases where there is
a close alignment of the fiduciary's interests and the
beneficiaries' interests, such as is often the case of directors and
their corporations. But greedy fiduciaries often act in ways that
create dissonance between their interests and their beneficiaries'
interest, in which case a court is likely to find a breach of duty.
Selfish motives will be evaluated according to their magnitude, as
well as their relative place among other motives. Not
surprisingly, courts are more likely to find legal liability in cases
involving high-magnitude selfishness as opposed to lowermagnitude selfishness, which may result in only indignant
disapproval or acquiescence. For example, a fiduciary may have a
plausible argument that her interests and the beneficiary's
interests were closely aligned, and even there are grounds for
doubting the fiduciary's assertion, a court may be reluctant to
conclude that the fiduciary has breached her duty. Since
educators do not generally have a financial stewardship, we
would not expect that greed would not be a dominant factor in
assessing the magnitude of duty in the educational context. But if
educators act in a greedy or self-serving manner, for example by
trying to take credit for a student's research or invention, the

119. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
120. See Renz v. Beeman, 589 F.2d 735,747 12d Cir. 1978) ("To upset the balance of control for
selfish gain is to commit a breach of the high fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty."); People v.
Bmzrnan, 901 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Colo. 1995) (finding that since "the respondent's breach of his
fiduciary duty to his clients was in large part motivated by greed," mitigating factors did not apply
and that such greed was in fact an aggravating factor); O'Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 112
(Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2002) (holding that an insurer acted in bad faith because "corporate greed
motivated [the insurer's] breach of fiduciary duty and that its greed was pervasive," deliberate, and
routine).
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fiduciary's greed could be a contributing factor in assessing the
degree of a breach of duty. 121

• Self-Enrichment: (significant, moderate, small, de minimis).
Closely related to greed is self-enrichment. One of the particular
ways in which a fiduciary can increase the likelihood of liability
for breaching her fiduciary duty is to enrich herself at the
expense of the beneficiary. 122 For example, when a director
approves the sale of a company, but receives a lucrative severance
package or consulting contract, this can create a private benefit
that does not accrue to all shareholders, which will increase the
likelihood that the director will be found liable for a breach of
fiduciary duty. Self-enrichment will likely be viewed as a highermagnitude breach if it takes place covertly, in which case the
likelihood ofliability is increased. 123
• Corporate Opportunities: (secretive, partial disclosure, full
disclosure, full disclosure and authorization). Another type of
conflict of interest arises when a fiduciary appropriates for
himself an opportunity that would be of interest to his
beneficiaries. A fiduciary is generally forbidden to take for
himself an opportunity that would be of interest to his
beneficiaries, without first presenting the opportunity to the
beneficiaries, having the beneficiary pass on the opportunity, and
giving the fiduciary permission to pursue it privately. 121 For
example, a partner who, upon receiving a very lucrative
engagement, immediately decides to resign from the partnership

121. See infra Part IV (B)-( C).
122. See e.g. Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So. 2d 942, 948 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
stockholder breached his fiduciary duty to investor through self-dealing, which was held to the
"higher degree of loyalty owed by a fiduciary").
123. See e.g. Ries v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 1995 WL 669583 at '7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995)
("A fiduciary's covert protlteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties of acting
'solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,' and of refraining !rom engaging in self~
dealing. Moreover, the failure to inform [plaintiff] of the discounting arrangement transgresses the
t!duciary duty of conveying important information and ensuring against misleading plan
participants." (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(A))).
124. See In re Sullivan, 305 B.R. 809, 819-20 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 2004) ('"It is widely
recognized that the appropriation of a corporate opportunity by an oftlcer or director' constitutes a
breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith .... 'A corporate officer or director is under a fiduciary
obligation not to divert a corporate business opportunity for his own personal gain. The rule is that if
there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation is
financially able to undertake which is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is
of practical advantage to it, and which is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable
expectancy, and if, by embracing the opportunity, the self interest of the officer or director will be
brought into conflict with that of this corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the
opportunity for himself."' (quoting Prod. Finishing Corp. v. Shields, 405 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich.
App. 1987))).

[.LUU:>

and pursue the opportunity for himself is guilty of expropriating
a partnership opportunity. When assessing whether an
opportunity was a corporate or partnership opportunity, a court
will consider the line of business in which the corporation or
partnership is engaged and how closely the opportunity is
aligned with the corporation or partnership's business. 125 A court
will also consider whether the partnership is a term partnership,
or an at will partnership. If it is a term partnership, and the term
of the partnership has expired, then an opportunity that does not
arise until the expiration of the term may not be viewed as a
partnership opportunity. As the Meinhard case illustrates,
however, a fiduciary's self-serving characterization of when an
opportunity arises may be rejected by a court. 126 We would not
expect the corporate opportunities doctrine to be a significant
theory of liability in the educational context. But if, for example,
a group of educators were working together in a partnership, and
if one of the partners were accused of seizing for himself an
opportunity that would have been of interest to the partnership,
then we would expect such behavior to be analyzed in the usual
manner.
• Anger, Hatred, Jealousy, Animus: (high, medium, low).
Conflicts of interest can manifest themselves in less
straightforward ways as well, including when a fiduciary acts out
of passion or animus, rather than out of a careful evaluation of
the best interests of the beneficiaries. Greed is not the only
emotion that can create a conflict of interest between a fiduciary
and his beneficiaries. For example, if a fiduciary acts out of
anger, hatred, or vengeance (among other inappropriate
emotions), even if there is no economic self-dealing, a court may
conclude that the fiduciary has violated fiduciary duties of loyalty
and good faith by engaging in a type of self-dealing. 127 We would
expect this factor to apply in the usual manner in the educational
context.

125. See Gen. Automotive Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1963).
126. JV!einhard, 164 N.E. at 550 (Andrews, j. dissenting) (characterizing the original lease as
creating a relationship analogous to a term partnership).
127. See In rc R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WI. 7036 at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1989) (finding that "the protections of the business judgment rule would /not] be available to a
fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated . . for a reason
unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation's best interests" and that "[g]reed is not the only human
emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or ..
shame or pride").
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Fear

Fiduciaries who are paralyzed by fear increase the likelihood of being
found liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, fiduciaries
who are extremely fearless, as manifested, for example, by an extreme
toleration or appetite for risk, are also likely to be found in violation of
their fiduciary duty. Fear can manifest itself in a variety of ways,
including an extreme aversion to making a mistake, or concern about
being found out, which may result in hiding mistakes.
• Extreme A version to or Appetite for Risk: (extremely cautions,
moderately cautious, appropriately cautions, moderately risky,
extremely risky). A fiduciary can breach his fiduciary duty both
by being too risk averse and by having too great an appetite for
risk. If a fiduciary has an unusual and unwarranted aversion to
risk and as a result fails to take advantage of opportunities that a
prudent person would take advantage of, this will increase the
likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary duty. On the
other hand, if a fiduciary has an inappropriately large appetite or
tolerance for risk, this also can increase the likelihood that a
court will find a breach of duty. What constitutes an appropriate
degree of risk aversion will vary significantly based upon a
number of contextual considerations including the character of
the beneficiary, and the goals and expectations of the beneficiary.
For example, the types and degree of risks that are appropriate
when investing the retirement funds of someone who is only a
few years from retirement will be significantly different than the
types and degree of risks that are appropriate for someone who is
still several decades away from retirement. In both contexts,
however, there will be a continuum, with types of behavior that
are too risk averse and other types of behavior that embrace too
much risk. Since educators are for the most part not fiduciaries
with oversight responsibility for investing money, we would not
expect this factor to be of particular significance in the
educational context.
• Hiding Mistakes: (systematic, ongoing, occasional, one time).
Another type of fear that may result in a court viewing a breach
of duty as being of a heightened magnitude is when a fiduciary
makes a mistake and does not want it to be discovered. If a
fiduciary tries to hide or cover up mistakes, this will increase the
likelihood that a court will find the underlying mistake to be a
high -degree breach of duty, and the act of hiding the mistake will
act as a magnifying factor. 1:>x Not surprisingly, systematic or

12H.

Sec Lasley v. Helms, XRO P.2d 1135, 1137-38 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 l<J<J·l) (holding that a
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ongoing hiding of mistakes is more likely to be characterized as a
high magnitude breach than hiding that is an exception to a
general pattern of candor and disclosure, or that represents a
one-time lapse. We would expect that this factor would apply in
the usual manner in the educational context.
d.

Laziness or Inattentiveness

Degree of Carelessness: (willful blindness, gross negligence,
negligence, care, diligence). A fiduciary can increase the
likelihood of liability for breach of fiduciary duty by being lazy,
inattentive, or careless. The greater the degree of negligence, the
greater the likelihood that a fiduciary will be found in breach of
duty. Usually the threshold of carelessness is quite high before
liability will exist. For example courts require gross negligence or
reckless disregard of important information to trigger fiduciary
liability rather than simple negligence, but if negligence rises to
the level of willful blindness, it is quite likely that a court will find
a breach of duty. 129 We would not expect educators to be liable
for breaches amounting to simple negligence, but that liability
for carelessness would be possible in instances where neglect of
duty rose to the level of gross negligence or willful disregard of
duty.
4.

Classification of the Alleged Breach

The manner in which an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is classified
will often have a significant effect on whether a breach of duty will be
found and on whether that breach will be regarded as being of a high or
low magnitude. For example, in Delaware, the state legislature adopted a
statutory amendment to the corporate code that enables companies to
adopt an amendment to their corporate charters that eliminates
monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care by directors, even in

doctor who negligently overprescribed an addictive sleeping pill and then continued to assure patient
that he was not addicted nor being harmed constituted constructive fraud, which "requires a
fiduciary ... relationship," because "[t)he professional's fiduciary and confidential relatiomhip with
his client or patient both compels the professional to disclose, rather than conceal, his error and
mitigates the injured person's duty to discover it independently" (quoting Gutierrez v. Majid, 705
P.2d 886, 890 (Cal. 1985))).
129. See Johnson v. Dallas Jndep. Sch. Dist., 38 !'.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 1994) (Goldberg,].,
dissenting) ("The deliberate indifference standard is a high legal threshold, used to distinguish
simple negligence from the type of willful blindness that is so extreme that it qualities as active
conduct for determining culpability."); see also White v. Rochjord, 592 f.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979)
(discussing liability based on gross negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of others).
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the event of gross negligence. 130 This has had the effect of reducing the
magnitude of breach associated with the duty of care. If a Delaware
corporation has adopted such a charter amendment under Section
102(b )(7), and if shareholders allege that directors have violated only
their duty of care, the court will dismiss the complaint. On the other
hand, in Delaware if plaintiffs provide evidence of a violation of the duty
of loyalty, then the burden of proof shifts to the directors to establish the
"entire fairness" of the transaction at issue, in which case the directors'
performance with respect to all of their fiduciary duties, including the
duty of care, will be evaluated as a part of an assessment of "entire
fairness." In such a case, an evaluation of the directors' alleged violations
of their duty of care will come in through the back door. Thus, in a case
involving Delaware directors, if a Section 102(b)(7) charter amendment
has been adopted, the fiduciary duty of care will typically only receive
substantive review if there has been a violation of a different fiduciary
duty.
a.

A Hierarchy of Alleged Breaches of Duty

Not all breaches of fiduciary duty are viewed as being equally
egregious. Most notably is the distinction between malfeasance
(affirmative misconduct) and nonfeasance (failure to act appropriately).
In general, a court is more likely to find liability for fiduciary conduct
that can fairly be characterized as malfeasance as opposed to
nonfeasance. There is something of an informal, if inexact, hierarchy of
alleged breaches of duty, based upon the nature of the breach, with fraud
at the top of the list of seriousness and prudence at or near the bottom.
We would suggest that the hierarchy would run approximately as follows:
fraud, self-dealing, disloyalty, conflicts of interest, disclosure,
disobedience, diligence, care, and prudence.
(i) Fraud

The prohibition on fraudulent conduct is at or near the top of the
hierarchy of types of breach of fiduciary duty. If a fiduciary commits
fraud, there is a high likelihood that a court will find a breach of fiduciary
duty.u 1 Indeed, the conduct may be covered by criminal and other civil
130. See, e.g. Delaware Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
131. Sec e.g In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d, 325, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (the court is
especially concerned with tfaud and the fiduciary because "it is this type of very special relationship
that enables a wayward fiduciary to engage in acts of concealment that 'cause the [principal] to relax
vigilance or deviate from the right of inquiry"' (emphasis removed) (citing Rubin Quinn Moss
Heaney & Patterson, P.C v. Kennel, H32 F. Supp. 922, 935 (E.D. Pa. !993))); see also Schwartz v.
Pierucci, 60 B.R. 397, 40J (Bankr. !'.D. Pa. 1986).

liability provisions, and so the concept of fiduciary duty may not
explicitly be a part of the analysis of legal culpability. 132 The definition of
fraud will vary from context to context and, in general, in areas where
there are other indicia that would suggest the existence of highmagnitude fiduciary duties, fraud will often be defined in a way that
makes it easier to prove the elements of the otiense, which will have the
effect of magnifying the prohibition of fraudulent behavior.
(ii) Self-Dealing
A related high magnitude breach of duty is self-dealing, or behavior
in which the fiduciary uses the beneficiary's property for his own
purposes, without regard for, or even contrary to, the interests of the
beneficiary. 131 Because it is a high magnitude breach of duty, self-dealing
is also likely to result in fiduciary liability for breach of duty. 1" 1 Self-

132. Sec e.g. Securities fxchangc Act of 1934, Rule IOb-5, 17 C.f.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (federal
securities rule that prohibits making "any untrue statement of a material fact", and also prohibits
engaging "in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person" in connection with purchase or sale of any security of any national
securities exchange); 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105 (Ll'XIS 2005) (ERISA provision which spells out liability for
breach by co-fiduciary, including concealing acts or omissions of other fiduciaries); 29 U.S.C:.S. §
I lOll (LEXIS 2005) (ERISA provision that enunciates prohibited transactions by a fiduciary,
particularly forbidding a fiduciary to deal with "assets of the plan in his own interest or li>r his own
account").
133. For examples of self-dealing, sec Iemberg v. Mann, 358 F3d 131, 135 (I st Ci r. 200·1)
(fiduciaries "[rnjay not misuse their ottlcial positions so as to harm the corporation ... in order to
advance their personal interests, their fiduciary obligations arise from and arc bounded by the
corporate relationship"); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John 1-i<mcock Mut. Life' Ins. Co., 302 !'.3d IH,
32 (2d Cir. 2002) (the court referred to ERISA§ !lOll (infra n. 143), and found that the in,urancc
company breached its tlduciary duty to avoid self-dealing because it "dealt with the assets of the plan
in [ih] own interest," by charging itself below-market rental rates on office properties); Sw:fimi v.
San.f(mf, 137 S.W.3d 391, 39R (Ark. 2003) (in a discussing fiduciary duties of a trustee, and citing the
rule that "[i]n adminislt'ring the trust, the trustee must act for the beneficiaries and not f(>r himself in
antagonism to the interest of the beneficiaries; he is prohibited from using the advantage of hi.s
position to gain any bene lit for himself at the expense of the beneficiaries and from placing himself
in any position where his self interest will, or may, conflict with his duties" (quoting Riegler F.
Ricj;ler, 553 S.W.2d 37,40 (Ark. 1977))).
134. Cases discussing self-dealing arc highly critical of any evidence of a fiduciary's acting in
their own self interest at the expense of a corporation or beneficiary. In one case the judge slated that
"[t]he fact that [the defendant] profited at all from the transfer of .. assets, even relatively
minimally, indicates the self-dealing nature of the switch." O'Malley v. Boris, 2002 Del. Ch. l.EXIS 33
at '19 n. 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2002). See Hpstein v. U.S., 174 f.2d 754, 764 (nth Cir. 1949)
(demonstrating suspicion that directors could be acting in their own interest or the intere't of one
other companies: "[tjransactions between corporations having interlocking directorates, the f'1irness
and good fC1i1h of which transactions are challenged, are jealously regarded by the law"); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., Inc., 750 A.2d 1219, 1238 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that even where a
limited partnership ended upon profiting from the self-dealing, their disloyal, self-dealing act would
still entitle the other partners to recover: "Delaware law docs not allow a disloyal fiduciary to protlt
from his breach.").
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dealing is closely related to the duty of loyalty, and sometimes selfdealing is treated as a particularly egregious violation of the duty of
loyalty. 135
(iii) Disloyalty
Also near the top of the hierarchy of breaches of fiduciary duty is
disloyalty. Disloyalty is a high magnitude breach that is quite likely to
result in a finding of a violation of fiduciary duty. For example, in the
corporate context, whereas the business judgment rule protects directors
from liability for mistakes that are made in good faith and after
reasonable investigation, there is no analogous shield protecting directors
from a violation of their duty of loyalty. 136 In its strongest formulation,
the duty of loyalty requires that a fiduciary put aside his own interests
and act in furtherance only of the interests of a beneficiary. 137 If there is
an alignment of interests, such as in a partnership, the expectation of
selflessness will be lower as long as the alignment of interests is
maintained. In some contexts it is also possible to contractually lower the

135. Not only does self-dealing lead to sanctions, but courts apply other legal remedies to help
the beneficiaries of a self-dealing fiduciary. For example, "[t]he benefit of the statute of limitations
will be denied to a corporate fiduciary who has engaged in fraudulent self-dealing." Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 169-70 (Del. 1976). Additionally, selfdealing is considered so serious that when there is self-dealing, courts sometimes find that there has
been a breach of fiduciary duty "even when the act taken is innocent and unintentional." Calc v.
Laws, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ark. 2002). Courts find that "[t]he duty of loyalty derives from the
prohibition against self-dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship. The fiduciary is not to
benefit at the expense of the corporation ... 'no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical
requirements."' Saginaw Products. Corp. v. Cavallo, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2030 at '11 (Conn.
Super. Aug. II, 1994) (quoting In rc Western World Funding, Inc., 53 B.R. 743,763 (Bankr. D. Nev.,
1985) (internal quotation omitted)).
136. Although the business judgment rule holds that a court will not "second-guess" a board's
decision, if a plaintiff shows a breach of fiduciary duty, the burden will shift to the fiduciary directors
to prove the "entire fairness" of a transaction. Cede & Co. v. Technicolar Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1991 ); See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 f.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[under normal
circumstances the directors of a corporation may determine, in the exercise of their business
judgment ... without review of the merits of their decisions by the courts. The business judgment
rule places a heavy burden on shareholders who would attack corporate transactions. But the
business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest. When a
shareholder attacks a transaction in which the directors have an interest other than as directors of the
corporation, the directors may not escape review of the merits of the transaction." (citations
omitted))
137. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547 (finding that partner in joint venture "held [the business
opportunity] as a fiduciary, for himself and another, sharers in a common venture" and describing
the duty of loyalty as "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of honor the most sensitive" (supra n. 19
and accompanying text)). This expression of the duty of loyalty is constantly cited by courts. See
Lawrence v. Cohn, 197 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) af/d, 325 F.3d 141 (2d C:ir. 2003); N.E.
Gen. Corp. v. Wellington, 82 N.Y.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. 1993); British Am. Oil Producing Co. v. Midway
Oil Co., 82 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Okla. 1938).
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obligations associated with the duty of loyalty. uH But if a fiduciary
expropriates a corporate or partnership opportunity for his own benefit,
the alignment of interests will be broken, and the fiduciary that has taken
the opportunity for himself will be in violation of his duty of loyalty. 13 Y
(iv) Conflicts oflnterest
Closely related to the duty of loyalty are problems that arise from
conflicts of interest. When the interests of the fiduciary and beneficiary
diverge, special measures must be taken by the fiduciary in order to avoid
breaching her fiduciary duty. For example, if a board of directors takes
defensive measures to prevent an unsolicited offer to buy the company,
due to the potential conflict of interest that exists between directors (who
may want to perpetuate themselves in office) and shareholders (who may
be interested in a sale at a premium of current stock price), courts often
subject the steps taken by directors to thwart such overtures under an
enhanced scrutiny standard. 140 When a transaction is subject to
intermediate scrutiny, a court will ask whether the board's actions were
in response to a reasonable perception of a threat to the corporation, and
whether the measures taken were proportional to the threat that
existed. 141 As a further example, when a director is involved as a principal
in a transaction with the corporation, her interests may conflict with

138. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 103(b)(2). When an LLC is formed, an
operating agreement sets up the structure of the LLC. The operating agreement can be constructed
quite broadly, but the act specifies that it may not "eliminate the duty ofloyalty" entirely.§ 103(b)(2).
The operating agreement may, however, "identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable." Jd. at (b)(2)(i). See McConnell v. Hunt
Sport.> Enterprises, 725 N.F..2d 1193, 1214 (Ohio App. lOth Dist. 1992) (finding no breach of duty to
loyalty when one member separately started hockey franchise that was initially proposed to the LLC
and stating that "[n]ormally, the presence of such a relationship would preclude direct competition
between members of the company. However, here we have an operating agreement which by its very
terms allows members to compete with the business of the company.").
139. See e.g. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[A] partner has a fiduciary
obligation to the partnership of the utmost good faith and loyalty and cannot divert a bminess
opportunity for his own gain without first making a complete and unambiguous disclosure to the
partnership."); Broz v. Cellular Inj(J. Syss., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996) ("a corporate officer or
director may not take a business opportunity for his own if: (I) the corporation is financially able to
exploit the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business; (3) the
corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for
his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the
corporation").
140. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954-55 (Del. 19R5) ([t]bc standard of
proof ... is designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed
motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which in
all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct").
141. Id.; see also Flake v. Hoskins, 55 f. Supp. 2d 1196, 1216 (D. Kan. 1999); Gilbert v. El Paso
Co., 575 A.2d 1 131 (Del. 1990).
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those of the corporation, and she must fully disclose the conflict to the
remaining disinterested members of the board and recuse herself from
the decision making process while the disinterested board members
decide whether the transaction is in the best interests of the
corporation. 142
(v) Disclosure
A medium-level breach of duty is a violation of a fiduciary's
obligations to disclose relevant material information to beneficiaries. The
exact contours of the duty of disclosure vary significantly from context to
context. 14 ·' Fulfilling the duty of disclosure may also involve a measure of
judgment, since determining what information is relevant or material
may not always be easy. 141 The duty to disclose material information
often arises in the corporate context. For example, directors have a duty
to disclose all material information to shareholders when soliciting
shareholder approval for a course of action the directors are
recommending. 145 It is quite common for disclosure failures to be linked
to other substantive fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty or the
duty of care. If a failure to disclose material information or the disclosure
of materially inaccurate information is the result of a breach of the
underlying duty of care, it is less likely that liability will be found than if
the incomplete or inaccurate disclosure is based upon a breach of the
underlying duty of loyalty. 146 This should not come as a surprise, since
142. Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Tnc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan. 2003) ("'t]he presence of a
majority of outside independent directors will materially enhance such evidence [that a reasonable
investigation determined that defensive measures are necessary]").
143. In some ERISA and securities cases, there is a duty to disclose any material fact that is
connected to the fidicuiary's obligations. See Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 389 F.3d 386, 401
(2d Cir. 2004) ("A number of authorities assert a plan fiduciary's obligation to disclose information
that is material to beneficiaries' rights under a plan, even if such information goes beyond the four
corners of the plan itself."). In other situations, the duty of disclosure is much more limited. See
Monetta Fin. Scrvs. v. Sees. Exch. Commn., 390 F3d 952,957-58 (7th Cir. 2004) (in finding that there
was no awareness of duty to disclose !PO allocations, the court emphasized that no disclosures were
expressly required, thus disclosure was not part of fiduciary duty for personal liability).
144. Partial disclosure can trigger full disclosure duties even with respect to information that
by itself may not have been material. Lewis v. Bank of AmericaNA, 347 F.3d 587, 587 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citing Union Pacific Resources Group Inc. v. Rhone, 247 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[a] duty to speak
arises by operation of law when ... one party voluntarily discloses some but less than all material
facts, so that he must disclose the whole truth, i.e. all material facts, lest his partial disclosure convey
a false impression")).
145. See Erickson v. Horing, 2002 WI. 31163611 at *14 (Minn. App. Oct. l, 2002) ("Under
Delaware law, a director owes a fiduciary duty to 'disclose fully and fairly all material information
within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action."' (quoting Arnold v. Socy. for Sav.
Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270,1277 (Del. 1994))).
146. See e.g. Johnson v. Shapiro, 2002 WL 31438477 at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002) (holding that
knowing or reckless withholding of material information is not shielded by Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §

loyalty is further up the hierarchy of duties than is care. Disclosure
problems based upon disloyalty will be treated more severely than
disclosure failures that are a result of mere carelessness.
(vi) Disobedience
A somewhat lower magnitude duty is the duty of obedience. The
primary reason obedience is regarded as a less onerous duty is because
the element of judgment and discretion is largely absent. 147 Rather, the
expectation is that the fiduciary will follow instructions and act in a
manner that is consistent with those instructions. In general, doing what
one is told is less difficult than is exercising good judgment in situations
involving complex and competing considerations. Because obedience
places relatively straightforward obligations upon a fiduciary, when a
fiduciary acts directly contrary to instructions given by a beneficiary, this
is quite likely to be viewed as a breach of duty. 14 x In some fiduciary
relationships where the degree of discretion of the fiduciary is very high,
direct questions of obedience may be unlikely. 149 On the other hand, if
the fiduciary is given clear instructions, then the duty of obedience is
more likely to be contested. For example, if a fiduciary is responsible for
the management of funds and the fiduciary has been given explicit
instructions or guidelines about the type of investments that are suitable,
direct disobedience of instructions is quite likely to result in liability,
especially if other indicia of degree of breach discussed above indicate a
breach oflarge magnitude. 1511

102(h)(7) (2001) but rather falls under a breach of the duty of loyalty).
147. Sec Ebusco Servs., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 402 !-'. Supp. 421, 44S (E.Il. Penn. l<J75)
(citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 33 (1<J58) ("an agent is a Gduciary," and as such, must
"obey the will of the principal as he knows it or should know it")). In Texas, the only duty of
obedience is to act within the powers of the corporation, so in order to breach the duty of obechencc,
it is necessary to knowingly commit '"acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation as
defined by its charter."' Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bonner, I<J93 U.S. !list. LEXIS 11107, at '4-5 (S.n.
Tex. June .l, 1993) (quoting Gearhart Indus. v. Smith, Int'l., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984)).
148. See e.g. Gagmm v. Coombs, 654 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Mass, App. 1995) (finding violation of
fiduciary duty of obedience where woman who had power of attorney refused to comply with the
principal's expressed wishes regarding property).
149. Sec e.g. Tysor1 v. Clayton, 7R4 F. Supp. 69, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that boxing
manager did not violate tlduciary duty by refusing to sign a promotional contract because,'" boxing
manager, "[manager] had a more complex responsibility to his client than does an ordinary fiduciary
to his principal ... [he was] hired to manage [boxer], a function that anticipates wmething more
than blind obedience to the boxer's every inclination").
150. The scope of tiduciary duty owed by a broker for a non-discretionary trust is often fairly
limitc·d, but courts will tlnd "a duty to properly carry out transactions ordered by the customer."
lruicx Future's Group, Inc. v. Uoss, 557 N.E.2d 344, 34H (Ill. App. 1st ])ist. 1990).
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(vii) Diligence
The fiduciary duty of diligence falls somewhat lower down the
hierarchy of fiduciary duties. Diligence is closely linked to the fiduciary
duty of care and can be seen as a magnified version of care. 151 When
particularly important decisions are being made, courts are more likely to
describe the duty of care as a duty of diligence. For example, when a
board of directors is contemplating an important transaction, such as the
sale of the business, they are expected to exercise due diligence in making
a decision and recommendation to shareholders. 152 The degree of care
that will be expected of them is somewhat higher than the degree of care
that will exist with respect to the day-to-day operations of the business,
which are much more likely to be given broad protection by the business
judgment rule. 151 Diligence is particularly important when discretionary
decisions are entrusted to fiduciaries, or where large financial losses can
accompany a failure to diligently investigate potential courses of
action. 151
(viii) Care
One of the most common and basic fiduciary duties is the duty of
care. While the duty is often described in rather lofty and demanding
ways, in practice a rather significant breach of the duty of care is required

151 Sec e.g In rc Blinder, Robinson & Co., 131 B.R. 872, 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
(acknowledging that law firm was honest and made full disclosures about its knowledge ofcontlict of
interest, hut finding that a "fiduciary duty of diligence required that a member of the finn scan
the . . register" to fulfill duty of care to eliminate possibility of conflict of interest); Rayman v.
!'copies Sovings Corp., I<JX9 U.S. Dist. LFXIS 10920 at '10 (N.D. IlL Sept. 12, 1989).
I ~2. Sec ,·.g Slllit!J, 4XX A.2d at 872 (In determining whether the business Judgment rule
applied in a merger that precluded a company from soliciting bids from other companies, the court
stated,"!, tjhc dcterrninat ion of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the
dirL·ctor~ have informed thcmsdvc~ 'prior to making a business decision, of all n1aterial infonnation
reasonably available to them."').

153. Sec e.g. Sc"IJ/cnskv v. Wrigley, 237 N. E.2d 776, 779 (IlL App. 1st Disl. 196X) (The court
dismis."·d a derivative suit against corporation, holding that the court would not examine the
business decision of whether the defendant should have held night games to generate more revenue.
'"Jn a rurcly bu.siness corporation ... the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of
the corporalion must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is without
authonty tu subqitute its judgment f(lr that of the directors."' (quoting Toe/Jc/man v. Missouril<cllzS<l.' i'ipc· I.ine Co., 41 F. Supp. 334,339 (D. DeL 1941), ajfd in part and reversed in part, 130 F.2d
1016 (3d Cir. 1'!42)). J'he court merely cited fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest as reasons br the
court to interfere with the honest business judgment in this purely business decision.).
I ">·1. See c _g. In rc Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663 (2d Disl. 1977) (holding that even where
a sctt lor has granted an absolute discretionary trust, trustee still has a fiduciary duty to reasonably
invcstig.11L' and gain information about investments); Francis v. United jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814,
S21 22 (N.f. 1<JHOJ ("[djirectors arc under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the
a~....-ti\·itlc-..'';.
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before courts are likely to find legal liability. The duty of care is often
linked to the concept of negligence. But a court is very unlikely to hold
liable a fiduciary guilty of simple negligence. Rather, negligencE' must
often rise to the level of gross negligence or reckless disregard of relevant
information before liability will be found. 155 Some business forms
affirmatively contemplate co-owners being able to contractually reduce
the degree of care owed to each other. 156 Courts, however, are sometimes
suspicious of such efforts at limitation if they are not the result of real
agreement and equal bargaining power. 157 As noted above, some states in
their corporate codes have limited or eliminated the duty of care of
directors. ~ Nevertheless, the duty of care is deeply imbedded in the
equitable concept of fiduciary duty, and even in jurisdictions where the
duty has been affirmatively limited by statute, the duty has exhibited a
stubborn persistence. ~
15

15

(ix) Prudence
Just as the duty of diligence can be viewed as a magnification of the
duty of care, the duty of prudence may be understood as a less
155. See e.g. In re Provenza. 316 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2003) ("In determining whether
a member of a member-managed LLC or a manager-managed LLC has breached a fiduciary duty to
the LLC: and its members, the courts employ, at a minimum, a gross negligence standard and the
business judgment rule.") (emphasis added)); Bass v. Cal Life Ins. Co., 581 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Miss.
1991) (holding that while adjusters are not liable to insureds for simple negligence in adjusting
claims, they can incur liability when their conduct constitutes gross negligence, malice, or reckle"
disregard for insureds' rights).
156. Sec e.g. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act§ 103(b)(3) (1996) (operating agreements
may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care" (emphasis added)); Uniform Partnership Act (1997)
§ 103(b)(4) (partnership agreements may not "unreasonably reduce the duty of care" (emphasis
added)).
157. See e.g. BT-l v. Eq. Life Assurance Socy., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 1412 (4th Dist. 1999)
(holding "a limited partnership agreement cannot relieve the general partner of its fiduciary duties in
matters fundamentally related to the partnership business").
L>H. See e.g. Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004); see also Thomas C. Lee, Limiting
Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of
Care, Ll6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 241-42 (1987); John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the
Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to
Claims Allegirzg Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. ).
Corp. L. Ill, Ill (2004).
159. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85,99 (Del. 2001) affd, 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003)
(holding that once the threshold of a breach of duty of loyalty or good faith is shown, the burden
shifts to directors to prove entire fairness of the transaction, and this includes a consideration of all
fiduciary duties, including duty of care); Prod. Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.. 863 A.2d
772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that since creditors did not approve the§ 102(b)(7) enactment,
they should not be limited by the statute's shielding of directors fi·om duty of care in the way that
shareholders can be limited); johnson v. Shapiro, 2002 WL 31438477 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002)
(holding that reckless or intentional failure to disclose material information is not shielded by §
102(b)(7))
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substantive and robust version of the duty of care. When a court says that
a fiduciary owes a duty of prudence, it is describing a very modest
standard of care. The duty of prudence can usually be fulfilled with
minimum procedural and substantive care. 160
b.

Significance of the Hierarchy of Breaches

A breach of a duty at or near the top of this hierarchy of duties is
more likely to result in legal liability than is a breach of a duty at or near
the bottom. Thus, not only will the specific description of the alleged
breach of duty be important, the way in which a court characterizes and
categorizes a breach of duty will have a direct effect on the likelihood that
legal liability will eventually be found. For example, sometimes a single
pattern of conduct could be described as amounting to a violation of the
duty of loyalty or the duty of care, but if a court accepts a
characterization that emphasizes carelessness (which might be viewed as
nonfeasance) it is less likely that the court will find liability than if the
court characterizes the behavior as implicating the duty of loyalty (which
is more likely to be viewed as malfeasance). Thus not only does the
category, character, and description of a fiduciary's misconduct affect
whether or not liability will attach, how a court chooses to categorize,
characterize and describe a fiduciary's misconduct will telegraph how the
court is likely to decide the case. Courts can magnify or diminish an
alleged violation of fiduciary duty by the way in which it categorizes the
breach.
c.

Applying the Hierarchy of Duties to Educators

In general, we would expect that this general hierarchy of types of
breaches of duty will apply in the educational context in a manner similar
to other contexts. Educators who are viewed as committing fraud,
violating their duties of loyalty, or exploiting conflicts of interest are
much more likely to be held legally liable than fiduciaries who are
accused of inattentiveness or imprudence. We would expect that sexual
misconduct by teachers, especially with minors or young adults, will be
viewed by courts as akin to a violation of the duty of loyalty or as selfdealing, in which case such conduct will be viewed as high-magnitude
breaches of duty with a high likelihood of legal liability. At the other end

160. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I)(B) (2005) (which provides in relevant part that "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would usc in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.").
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of the spectrum, we would expect it to be quite unlikely that educators
will be held liable in cases where their sole wrongdoing involves an
alleged violation of a duty of care or prudence.
C.

The Availability of an Appropriate Remedy

The third step in an analysis of the likelihood that a fiduciary will be
found liable for a breach of fiduciary duty focuses upon the availability of
an appropriate and meaningful remedy. It might seem that the remedy
would only become a focus of consideration after a determination has
been made that liability should attach, but in a number of cases it appears
that courts consider whether a remedy is available as a part of their
determination of whether liability should exist at all. This might be in
part because a court may be reluctant to find liability when an
appropriate remedy does not seem to exist. On the other hand, if there is
an available and obvious remedy to an alleged breach, this may actually
increase the likelihood that a court will find that there has been a breach
of duty.
A wide array of remedies are imposed in cases involving breaches of
fiduciary duty. Similar to breaches, potential remedies seem to exist in an
informal hierarchy based upon the degree of burden or magnitude of
penalty placed upon the fiduciary to remedy his breach of fiduciary duty.
At the bottom of the hierarchy would be the requirement to give an
accounting, followed in roughly ascending order by, disclosure,
disgorgement, recession, restitution, actual damages, an injunction,
specific performance, removal from office, punitive damages,
decertification, and imprisonment.
In general, courts reserve the most severe penalties for instances of
high magnitude breaches of high magnitude duties. So for example,
imprisonment, decertification, and punitive damages will normally be
reserved for severe breaches of serious duties. On the other hand, a
remedy such as requiring an accounting or requiring a full disclosure will
be more common in situations involving lower degree violations of lower
degree duties. If a severe penalty is sought, a court will most likely require
proof of a high magnitude breach and high magnitude duty. If an
appropriate remedy does not seem to exist, this will decrease the
likelihood that a court will find that a fiduciary relationship exists or, if
such a relationship does exist, that there has been a breach of duty.
IV.

APPLYING THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK IN FOUR TYPES OF
EDUCATION CASES

The analytic framework introduced in Part III helps us understand
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and evaluate how courts will address a wide variety of issues involving
alleged violations of fiduciary duties by educators. When the facts of a
particular case are evaluated against the factors that are utilized by courts
in assessing the magnitude of duties, the magnitude of breaches, and the
availability of an appropriate remedy, it is usually possible to ascertain
with some confidence whether or not a court will find that there has been
a breach of fiduciary duty. By way of illustration, we will briefly address
four sets of recurring issues that arise in education: (i) cases involving the
evaluation and grading of students; (ii) cases involving research
relationships; (iii) cases involving patents and other intellectual property;
and (iv) cases involving allegations of sexual harassment or misconduct.
A.

Academic Evaluation and Advisement

Disgruntled students have brought a variety of lawsuits alleging
violations of fiduciary duty by schools and universities in the grading and
evaluation process. These cases tend to involve rather low degree alleged
duties combined with small magnitude alleged breaches, and thus it is
not surprising that courts have often refused even to recognize that such
claims involve a fiduciary relationship, 161 or have concluded that the
student has failed to prove the elements of a fiduciary relationship. 1" 2
When a fiduciary relationship is acknowledged in the context of grading
and evaluation, courts have uniformly found no breach of duty. 163

161. Some courts sidestep or explicitly reject the claim that such cases involve a vinlation of
fiduciary duty by characterizing the cases as involving assertions of "educational malpractice,'' or
"inadequate services." Sec e.g. Ross v. Creighton U, 957 F. 2d 410, 414 n. 2 (7th C:ir. 1992) (citing
"'"es from eleven other states that have considered and rejected educational malpractice claims);
l'etcr W. v. S.F. Unijied Sch. JJist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (App. 1st Dist. 1976) (rejecting student
claim alleging inadequate education). So classitied, courts usually follow the road of declining to
entertain claims of educational malpractice or inadequate educational services as a matter of public
policy. See Regents o(the U. of Mich. v.l:'wing, 474 U.S. 2!4, 226 (1985); Ross, 957 F.2d at414 (stating
that federal courts are inapt to evaluate the substance of academic decisions made by educators on
daily basis); Gaily v. Columbia U., 22 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing student's
cbim that school failed to provide an effective education as an "impermissible attempt to avoid the
mle that there is no claim in New York for 'educational malpractice'"). Other courts .sidestep the
claim that such cases involve fiduciary relationships by asserting that the relationship between the
student and the university as strictly contractual. See e.g. Andre, 655 N.Y.S. 2d at 779; Prusack 1'.
State, 117 A.D.2d 729, 729 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1986).
162. In evaluation cases, courts often conclude that the student has t;,i]cd ackquatdy to prove
that a fiduciary relationship exists. See Zumbrun v. U. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. ·199, 506 (App. 2d
!Jist. I '172) ("The mere placing of trust in another person does not cr-eate a fiduciary relationship");
Shapiro 1'. Ruttcrjicld, 921 S.W.2d. 649,651-52 (Mo. App. 1996) (holding student failed to establish
that a liduciary relationship existed with her faculty advisor); Abrams v. Mary Washington College.,
33 Va. Cir. 449,454 (Va. Cir. 1994) (holding that there is no common law "special trust relationship"
between students and college officials).
lld. One tactic courts use is to reject claims based on the evaluation or grading process on the
basis that student has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Sec e.g. Montalvo v. U. ofMiwni,
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Consider the following representative cases. 1" 4
In Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga University, 165 the Washington Court of
Appeals rejected a law student's claim that her law school had a duty to
warn her of the possibility that she might fail, and denied her request that
the law school be ordered to grant her a law degree. This cases involves a
low-level alleged duty (failure to warn of possible failure in law school), 166
with a low level alleged breach (negligence on the part of the law
school), 167 and a very demanding request for relief (ordering the law
school to grant plaintiff a law degree). Not surprisingly, the court refused
even to acknowledge the existence of a fiduciary duty in the case, 16x and
noted that as a "general rule, courts will not interfere with purely
academic decisions of a university." 16Y
In Andre v. Pace University, 1711 a New York trial court noted that
educators assume fiduciary duties towards students they supervise when
it granted a student request for a tuition refund for a class in which a
professor had incorrectly assured them that the course would not be too
difficult for them in spite of their limited math and science
backgrounds. 171 The case was reversed on appeal, on the grounds that the
relationship between students and a university is contractual in nature
and that the claim was an invalid assertion of "educational
malpractice." 172 The court declined to engage "in a comprehensive review
of a myriad of educational and pedagogical factors, as well as
administrative policies that enter into the consideration of whether the
method of instruction and choice of textbook was appropriate, or
preferable, for a graduate level course .... " 171
705 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1998).
164. See also id. (rejecting the claim of a graduate student who had failed his comprehensive
oral exam that the University had breached a fiduciary duty through bias and animosity on grounds
that student failed to provide any direct evidence that the University breached a fiduciary duty owed
to him).
165. Maas v. Corp. of Gonzaga U., 618 P.2d 106 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1980).
166. The court states, "It is unreasonable to require the university to warn applicants of the
obvious." Id. at 108.
167. The court points out that Maas did not allege bad faith on the part of the law school in its
refusal to accept transfer credits from another institution. Bad faith would constitute a higher
magnitude breach than negligence. Id. at 109. The court also goes out its way to document the
lengths to which Gonzaga Law School went in trying to accommodate Maas, noting that she was
twice reinstated after falling below the minimum grade point average. Id. at 107-08.
168. "The relationship of students and universities is generally contractual rather than
confidential or fiduciary." Id. at 108.
169. Id. at 109.
170. 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1996).
171. Id. at 780.
172. ld.
173. hi. at 779-80.

159]

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF EDUCATORS

221

The outcome of Andre is what one would expect from an analysis of
the magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach alleged in the case. The
alleged duty is a duty to warn students of the possibility that they might
fail if they did not have the requisite math and science backgrounds. This
is a low level duty, and does not seem to be the type of information that a
student would have to rely upon professors to ascertain. The alleged
breach was an assurance by the professor that students with limited math
and science backgrounds would be able to pass the course. This would
seem to be at best a very low-magnitude breach of duty. Thus, the case
combines a low magnitude duty with an alleged breach which is of a low
magnitude. Since the duty is modest, the level of performance by the
fiduciary does not need to be particularly high in order to clear the
fiduciary bar. Not surprisingly, the court deferred to something akin to
an educational judgment rule and declined to engage in a substantive
review of the range of educational and policy factors that went into the
university's judgment that students with a certain background could take
the course.
In Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 174 the Texas Court of
Appeals granted summary judgment to university professors in a claim
by a disappointed doctoral candidate who alleged that her professors'
failure to disclose material information to her caused her to continue
within the doctoral program and suffer damages. In this case, the plaintiff
alleged a relatively low-level duty (a duty to inform), 175 and a relatively
high degree breach of duty (a fraudulent misrepresentation of material
facts). 176 This combination of low-degree duty and high-degree breach
might result in liability if the plaintiff successfully proved fraud.
The fraud claim rested upon a finding that the student-teacher
relationship is a fiduciary relationship that triggered an affirmative duty
on the part of the professors to inform the plaintiff of material facts and
that the failure to disclose those facts amounted to a material false
representation. 177 The court began its analysis by noting that there is no
formal fiduciary relationship between teachers and students in a normal
educational setting. Thus, liability in this case turned upon whether an
informal fiduciary relationship existed based upon an unusual degree of
trust and reliance. The court noted that "an informal relationship may
give rise to a fiduciary duty where one person trusts in and relies upon

174. 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 7th Dist. 1998).
175. The court stated that "[a] duty to speak may arise when a fiduciary relationship exists
between parties." Id. at 691.
176. The court notes that "silence may equate to a positive misrepresentation of material facts
when there is a duty to speak." Id.
177. !d. at 692.
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another, whether the relationship is a moral, social, domestic, or purely
personal one." 17x On the other hand, the court also observed that
"although fiduciary relationships are based upon trust, not all
relationships involving a high level of trust and confidence require that
the parties act with good faith and with due regard to the interests of the
one reposing confidence." 179
In determining whether an informal fiduciary relationship existed in
this situation, the court focused upon whether "influence ha[d] been
acquired and abused," and whether the alleged fiduciary "personally
gain [ed] from the trust and confidence reposed by another." The court
credited the professors' testimony that they "did their usual job duties of
teaching, advising, and evaluating," and that the duties of Ho "were those
usually and normally required of doctoral students." 1xo On this basis the
court concluded that an informal fiduciary relationship did not exist and
the professors did not have an affirmative duty to speak. Because the
degree of power or control in this student-teacher relationship was not
heightened, and because there was no evidence of personal gain, selfdealing, or selfish motives on the part of the professors, the court held
that there was no informal fiduciary relationship giving rise to a duty to
speak. 1H1 In this case although the plaintiff alleged a high-degree breach,
the factual basis for the allegation of fraud was very weak, and the court
did not perceive a high magnitude breach of duty. The low-level duty
combined with insufficient evidence of a high-level breach resulted in a
finding of no liability for the university.
B.

Research Relationships

An informal fiduciary relationship might arise between a student
and a professor or university in the research environment, where a
student may invest a high degree of trust and confidence in a teacher or
advisor. Courts examine such relationships closely in order to determine
the magnitude of an alleged duty and the magnitude of an alleged breach
in claims involving research relationships. A case involving a Yale
University doctoral candidate who alleged that his dissertation advisors
misappropriated his research ideas and published them as their own is a
good case in point.
In Johnson v. Schmitz, 1x2 a graduate student at Yale University

17S. !d. at 692.
179. Id.
180. ld. at 693.
IX! Jd.
182. 119 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Conn. 2000).
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accused professors on his dissertation committee of stealing his ideas and
discouraging him from pursuing them in order to allow themselves to
misappropriate the ideas for themselves. 1 ~ 3 He also accused the university
of failing to intervene to protect his interests. The district court
analogized the relationship of a dissertation committee and a graduate
student to that of an attorney and client. 1x4 The court noted that fiduciary
duties could arise in new situations and stated that fiduciary relationships
are "characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between
the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is
under a duty to represent the interests of the other." xs
This case involved an alleged heightened degree of duty (based upon
the unique degree of trust and reliance placed by a graduate student upon
his dissertation committee due to the professors' superior knowledge,
skill or expertise), 1' 6 combined with a very high degree breach of duty
(faculty misappropriation and plagiarism of a student's idea). 1 s~ Given
the procedural posture of the case, the factual allegations were assumed
to be true, and the district court denied the university's motion to
dismiss. The outcome is not unexpected given the combination of
heightened duty and high degree alleged breach.
1

C.

Patents and Inventions

Another area with a potential combination of high degree duties and
JHl.

ill

l R4.

/d. at '!H.

l XS.

!d. at 97.

IHh. rhe court noted that plaintiff alleges that since Yale was '"in a po,ition of l'"'"'' and
authority' over him and 'in a position of trust and confidentiality with regard to his cduG1tion ideas
and work product,' Yale had a fiduciary duty toward him, kscd on the 'uniquc[ness]' of the
particular relationship between a 'graduatclcvel student and an educational institution." !d. al 97.
The court abo noted that "Yale allegedly represented that it would safeguard its students from fcKulty
misconduct and provide a nurturing environment f(Jr its student>." !d. at 'JH. "Plaintiff may further
develop such fctclual iS>ues as Yale's representation of its mi>Sion towards graduate students, and

whether or not it represented that it would take care of graduate students to the exclusion of all
others, which could be relevant to the determination of whether Y,1lc owed a i'iduciary duty to
Johmon." !d.
I H7. ( ln a motion to dismiss, the court assumes the accuracy of the plaintiffs allegations,
including that one of his professors published the student's theory as his own without nttributing the
student. 'I he court notes that "[u[pon further fctctual development, plaintiff may be able to show that

the· high degree of trust and confidence he placed in his professors was ju,tificd. His relatiomhip
with ,~chmitz and Skelly [his advisors] was personal nnd individualized, and a.s his advisors, they had
some duty to protect his interests. Accordingly, this relationship appears somewhat .lllalogous to the
attorney-client relationship because the members of his committee were not entitled to act f(,r their
own benefit. l'urther, Schmitz allegedly encouraged Johnson to trust him in sharing his dissertation
idc:b, and stated that fclilurc to do so would he detrimental to Johnson's academic prospects. This act
of L'llLouragcmcnt i~ rcleYant to the consideration whether a fiduciary n:lationship wa~ created here."

!d. at LJH.
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large magnitude breaches is student research that results in patentable
inventions. There have been a number of cases in which students have
claimed that faculty supervisors and universities have breached their
fiduciary duty by failing to give students credit for patentable work. In
these cases, courts examine closely the alleged magnitude of duty and
alleged magnitude of breach. Duties may be heightened based upon the
intense student-mentor relationships that can exist between graduate
students and professors, and the superior knowledge and skill that may
create heightened reliance and dependence of students upon professors.
Breaches are also potentially large since the possibility of deception, selfdealing, and self-enrichment on the part of professors and universities
may exist. A pair of cases with apparently similar facts, but different
outcomes, provides an interesting view of courts' subtlety and
sophistication in evaluating such claims.
In Chou v. University of Chicago, xx a graduate student sued a
supervising professor claiming that the professor and the University had
breached a fiduciary duty by fraudulently stealing patent and
inventorship rights that belonged to her. The professor, Dr. Bernard
Roizman, allegedly told Chou that her discoveries could not be patented,
while at the same time filing a patent application naming himself as the
sole inventor. x~ Chou alleged fraud, a high-level breach of duty, and
claimed that Dr. Roizman had a duty to disclose her participation in the
invention, a rather low-level duty. Thus the case combined a relatively
low level duty, which would not seem to require a high degree of
performance, and a very high-level breach. In effect, the student argued
that although Dr. Roizman did not have to do very much to fulfill his
duties to her, he failed miserably even in performing this relatively
modest duty, and instead engaged in affirmative wrongdoing.
The district court, however, dismissed Chou's claim on the grounds
that she lacked standing because she had "surrendered all her rights to
the University under an employment agreement." 1Y11 The court of appeals
reversed, holding Roizman liable for a breach of fiduciary duty, JYJ and
holding the University liable under a theory of respondeat superior. 192
The court of appeals noted that some fiduciary duties arise automatically
from certain types of relationships, and others arise informally from
1

1

188. 254 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 20tJI).
189. Id. at 1353. Professor Roizman told the United States Patent and Trademark Office that
though the discoveries were outlined in publications co-authored with Chou, she was only working
"under his direction and supervision." !d.
190. Id. at 1354.
191. Id. at 1362-63.
192. !d. at 1361.
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special circumstances, "such as when one part justifiably places trust in
another so that the latter gains superiority and influence over the
former." 1 ~ 3 The court considered a number of factors to support its
conclusion that a fiduciary duty existed in this situation: "disparity in age,
education, and business experience between the parties, and the extent to
which the 'servient' party entrusted the handling of its affairs to the
'dominant' party and placed its trust and confidence in that party." 194
These factors all have the effect of increasing the degree of duty in the
case. The court also noted the element of self-dealing in Professor
Roizman's seeking a selfish benefit at the expense of the beneficiary, 19 " a
consideration that increases the degree of breach. The court of appeals
found liability by engaging in a process of analysis that increased the
magnitude of duty in the case. When the duty was viewed as being of a
higher magnitude, the court could more easily view the conduct of Dr.
Roizman as constituting a breach of duty.
In a subsequent case, University of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies, 1%
the same court of appeals that granted Chou's claim did not find a breach
of fiduciary duty in a case with superficial similarities to the Chou case. In
VanVoorhies, the University of West Virginia sued VanVoorhies for
failing to assign an invention to the University that Van Voorhies
invented around the time he received his doctoral degree from the
University, as required by University regulations. 197 Van Voorhies filed a
counterclaim in which he alleged that Dr. James E. Smith, a professor
with whom he worked while while in the process of attaining his
doctorate degree violated his fiduciary duty to Van Voorhies by "inducing
VanVoorhies to list [Smith] as a co-inventor [on an earlier patent]
application," enabling the professor to share in the revenues from the
patent. 19x The court distinguished the Chou case on several grounds. In
\'an Voorhies there did not exist the same type of relationship of trust as
in the Chou case, and that even if a relationship of trust did exist, there
was no evidence that the professor violated that trust by inducing
VanVoorhies to list the professor as a co-inventor of the first
invention. 199 These factors indicate that the degree of duty was lower than
in Chou. Also missing was the element of secrecy that existed in the Chou
case. The court noted that Van Voorhies "participated in and acceded" to

1\13.

!d. a! 1362.
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!d.
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!d.

1%.

271l1'.3d 12HH, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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!d. at 1294.
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the joint patent application, knowing that this would mean that his
professor would share in the proceeds under the University's patent
policy. 2011 Thus, the magnitude of the alleged breach was also lower than
in the Chou case.
These two cases provide an interesting contrast. In Chou the court
found that a fiduciary relationship existed with respect to graduate
students and their patent applications, whereas in Van Voorhies the court
found that a fiduciary relationship did not exist. When we consider the
factors that contribute to a calculation of the magnitude of duty and the
factors that contribute to a calculation of the magnitude of breach, the
outcomes are not surprising. The magnitude of duty for the two cases
hinges on the cause of reliance and amount of trust the student placed in
the professor. In Chou the court noted that Roizman had assured Chou
that he would take care to properly protect her research and inventions,
and she trusted him to do so. In Van Voorhies however, no such element
of elevated trust was present, as Van Voorhies had acceded to the
decisions being made regarding his invention by jointly signing the
patent application and assignment with Smith. The magnitude of the
breach differs in the two cases as well. Chou claimed that Roizman
breached his duty to her by acting in his own interest to unjustly enrich
himself when he named himself inventor of Chou's discoveries. 201 On the
other hand, although Van Voorhies claimed Smith had breached a
fiduciary duty owed to him by inducing Van Voorhies to list Smith as a
co-inventor of his first invention, the court in Van Voorhies noted that
Van Voorhies failed to present any evidence that Smith had breached his
duty. Rather, VanVoorhies had acceded in the decisions being made
regarding his inventions, and was aware that Smith would be entitled to a
share of the proceeds under the school's patent policy. 21 ' 2 These cases
exhibit a high level of sensitivity to the types of consideration that have
been identified as affecting the degree of duty and the degree of breach in
situations where a violation of fiduciary duty is alleged.
D.

Sexual Harassment

Claims of sexual harassment often combine a high magnitude duty
with a high magnitude breach, so not surprisingly this is an area where
courts have been willing to find a fiduciary relationship between
universities and students. 201 Even in situations where courts find that the

200.
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magnitude of duty is low, sexual harassment is viewed by many courts as
such an egregious act that the court may still find the defendant legally
liable for breach.
For example, in Schneider v. Plymouth State College, 204 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that "in the context of sexual harassment
by faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary
institution and its students is a fiduciary one." 205 The Schneider case
involved a high degree duty combined with a high degree breach of duty.
In assessing the degree of duty, the court noted that "[s]tudents are in a
vulnerable situation because 'the power differential between faculty and
students ... makes it difficult for [students] to refuse unwelcome
advances and also provides the basis for negative sanctions against those
who do refuse."' 206 The Court also observed that
[t]he relationship between students and those that teach them is built
on a professional relationship of trust and deference, rarely seen outside
the academic community. As a result, we conclude that this
relationship gives rise to a fiduciary duty on behalf of the defendants to
create an environment in which the plaintiff could pursue her
education free from sexual harassment by faculty members. 207
While the degree of duty to provide an educational environment free
from professorial harassment is characterized as being high, the degree of
breach by Professor Leroy Young was also very high. As a sophomore in
college, Schneider enrolled in two graphic design courses taught by
Young. Schneider decided to major in graphic design, and Young, the
only graphic design professor at the University, became her academic
advisor. Soon after, Young began harassing Schneider. According to the
court, "Young's behavior included pressuring the plaintiff to accompany
him on trips to various locations off campus, kissing her, sending her
flowers, taking off her shirt, and placing her hand on his genitalia.
Young's conduct escalated to the point that ... he completely disrobed in

of sexual harassment hy faculty members, the relationship between a post-secondary institution and
its studenb is a fiduciary one."); Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual H<uassment and Higher Education, 65
Tex. L Rev. 525, 552 (19R7) (descrihing faculty-student relationships as a fiduciary relationship); But
sec Williamson v. Bernstein, 5 Mass. !.. Rptr. 94 (Mass. Super. 1996) (holding that professor who
offered therapy sessions to student without qualification or authorization and engaged in sexual
relationship with student did not breach fiduciary duty and university did not breach fiduciary duty
by failing to investigate professor's conduct).
204.
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206. Td. at 104, quoting Bogart & Stein, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Education,
64 Peabody). Educ. 146,157 (1987).

207. Jd. at 106.

LL.I5

l5.l.U. tVU\....-1\llUl"\11\l'IV Ll\VV JUUKJ"\11\L

[L.VV:J

his office while the plaintiff was working on his computer." 2 °K When
Schneider attempted to rebuff Young's advances, "he would become
angry, yell at her, and threaten to make her life very difficult. Young
withheld academic support for her academic work and ridiculed her in
front of faculty. He also gave the plaintiff a grade of 'C-' for her work as
in intern at a graphic design company without ever consulting with her
supervisor at the company." 209 A number of professors had various
degrees of knowledge of the harassment, but no action was taken until
after Schneider had graduated. The combination of a duty that is
characterized as being of a high magnitude and the breach of duty, which
was of a very high magnitude, resulted in a holding that a fiduciary duty
existed and an affirmation of the jury's finding that there had been a
breach of fiduciary duty.
Williamson v. Bernstein, 2111 provides a striking contrast to Schneider.
In Williamson, a female student brought claims of negligence against her
professor Alan Bernstein, Fitchburg State College, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, claiming that Bernstein had
negligently provided educational and therapeutic counseling services and
induced her to have a sexual relationship with him. The Massachusetts
court dismissed the claims against the college and commonwealth for
breach of fiduciary duty due to the fact that even if Williamson were to
prove that a fiduciary relationship existed with Bernstein, his
"undertaking to provide therapeutic services and engaging in sexual
relations . . . does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship between
[Williamson] and the College" because he was not acting within the
scope of his duty as a professor. 211
It may be that the outcomes in this case and the Schneider case are
simply irreconcilable, except based upon different policy conceptions
about the scope of employment and the doctrine of respondeat superior.
After all, Professor Young's behavior appears to have been no more
within the scope of his employment than Professor Bernstein's behavior
was. The opinions in the two cases, however, do suggest that there may
have been some additional differences. Williamson's claim was based
upon allegations of negligence, a relatively low-level duty, whereas the
alleged duty in the Schneider case was a higher magnitude affirmative
duty to create an educational environment free from sexual harassment
by faculty members. The court's characterization of the degree of duty in
the Schneider case was much higher than even the plaintiffs
20R
209.
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characterization of the duty in the Williamson case. In addition, the court
in Schneider based the magnitude of fiduciary duty upon the uniqueness
of the relationship that occurs when a student enrolls in the college, thus
becoming dependent upon the school for her education, and "requiring
them to act in good faith and with due regard for [her] interests." 212 In
contrast, the Williamson court asserts that Williamson "does not allege
that she placed any trust or confidence in the College for any particular
purpose so as to create a fiduciary relationship .... "213 The magnitude of
breach in Williamson was also arguably lower than the magnitude of
breach in Schneider. For example, it appears that the Massachusetts court
did not view Williamson as being as vulnerable and trusting as the New
Hampshire court viewed Schneider as being. Whereas Schneider is
described as a nineteen-year-old college sophomore subject to unwanted
sexual advances of a sexual predator who had harassed multiple students,
Williams is described as a mother of two children who engaged in a
consensual affair with her professor after complaining to him that "her
husband did not understand her or her problems .... "214 In any event,
the cases illustrate the importance of the manner in which the magnitude
of the degree of duty and the magnitude of the degree of an alleged
breach of duty is characterized in cases of this nature.
V.

CONCLUSION

Assertions that educators have fiduciary duties continue to be
controversial. The teacher-student relationship is not a "formal fiduciary
relationship," but a number of courts have held that this relationship
rises to the level of an "informal fiduciary relationship" in a variety of
contexts and circumstances. If a case of alleged breach of fiduciary duty
in the educational context is analyzed against the framework for
quantifying the magnitude of an alleged duty and the magnitude of an
alleged breach outlined in this article, educators, supervisors, attorneys
and judges will be able to assess reliably the likelihood that an educator
or educational institution will, and should, be found by a court to have
violated his or her fiduciary duties to students, as well as the probable
severity of remedy that the court would impose.
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